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Executive summary
Diasporas – communities which live outside, but maintain links with, 
their homelands – are getting larger, thicker and stronger. They are 
the human face of globalisation. Diaspora consciousness is on the 
rise: diasporans are becoming more interested in their origins, and 
organising themselves more effectively; homelands are revising their 
opinions of their diasporas as the stigma attached to emigration 
declines, and stepping up their engagement efforts; meanwhile, host 
countries are witnessing more assertive diasporic groups within their 
own national communities, worrying about fi fth columns and foreign 
lobbies, and suffering outbreaks of ‘diasporaphobia’.
This trend is the result of fi ve factors, all of them connected with 
globalisation: the growth in international migration; the revolution 
in transport and communications technology, which is quickening 
the pace of diasporans’ interactions with their homelands; a reaction 
against global homogenised culture, which is leading people to rethink 
their identities; the end of the Cold War, which increased the salience 
of ethnicity and nationalism and created new space in which diasporas 
can operate; and policy changes by national governments on issues such 
as dual citizenship and multiculturalism, which are enabling people to 
lead transnational lives. Diasporas such as those attaching to China, 
India, Russia and Mexico are already big, but they will continue to 
grow; the migration fl ows which feed them are likely to widen and 
quicken in the future.
The strengthening of diasporas has important implications for 
global economics, politics and security. The world is becoming 
aware of the awesome economic power of remittances: in 2006, for 
instance, remittances to developing countries were probably almost 
as large as total foreign direct investment in developing countries, 
and three times the world’s combined foreign aid budgets. Diaspora 
networks can also stimulate bilateral trade and investment and 
mobilise other fi nancial fl ows. On the other hand, high emigration 
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can impose a signifi cant economic cost on those left behind in some 
developing countries.
In the political arena, diasporic groups are becoming more prominent 
players in host country politics, and their infl uence is being felt in their 
homelands, too. Homeland capitals are reaching out to their diasporas: 
singing their praises; creating diaspora institutions; ministering to 
their religious needs, as with Turks abroad; and engaging them in 
the processes of national politics. The trend towards awarding voting 
rights to citizens living abroad is throwing up many diffi cult questions 
– as seen in Italy, for example, where MPs elected by Italians abroad 
helped recently to vote one prime minister out of offi ce and to vote 
confi dence in another.
The spike in diaspora consciousness also raises noteworthy security 
issues. Diasporas provide foot soldiers for intelligence services and 
ethnically-based criminal networks, and they can foster extremism 
and sustain insurgencies back home. On the other hand, while 
diasporas can be a medium for the transmission of social risk, they can 
also mitigate risk by supporting young people who might otherwise 
fall prey to more dangerous forms of identity politics, such as Jihadist 
Islamism. Finally, if diasporas can pose security threats, they are also 
subject to them. In many parts of the world, the demand for consular 
protection is surging, and homelands such as China are stepping up to 
meet this demand. This has implications for power politics, because 
states are likely to bump up against each other as they seek to protect 
their distant citizens.
The tightening of diasporic connections complicates life for national 
governments in many different ways. The existence of a large diasporic 
community affects the defi nition of the national interest – and of 
course the interests of homeland and diaspora are rarely identical. 
Diasporas pose new issues for governments, which they are poorly 
equipped to handle. Even as diasporas become stronger, they become 
harder to control: they are demanding, but it is diffi cult to make 
demands of them. Homelands are keen to work with their diasporas, 
but they are not good at operating outside their jurisdictions and their 
diaspora policies tend to be clunky and ineffective. Indeed, national 
authorities often have no idea where their people are living, let alone 
what they are doing and how they might be tapped. Accordingly, many 
governments are displaying bipolar tendencies in relation to diasporas, 
exhibiting equal generosity to their emigrants and meanness to 
their immigrants. It is inherently diffi cult to design public policy in 
relation to a distant population. In the immediate term, therefore, the 
principles that should guide homelands’ dealings with their diasporas 
are modesty and pragmatism. Perhaps nations can be global, but states 
usually cannot. 
Host countries will also need to be realistic, by accepting that 
many of their people possess plural national identities. Like the 
mixobarbarians of Byzantine times, who were neither Hellenes nor 
barbarians but had qualities of both, many of us now live in frontier 
regions (whether physical or virtual) and hold multiple overlapping 
identities. We are all mixobarbarians now. Governments should be 
careful to separate broad issues of identity, therefore, from the urgent 
but narrower issues of security. 
There are implications, fi nally, for the international system as well as 
its component states. The world would profi t from the development of 
rules or understandings on a number of diaspora issues, including the 
cost of remittances, the permissibility of long-distance politicking and 
activism, and the protection of nationals. The triangular relationships 
between diasporas, homelands and host countries need to be managed 
adroitly to ensure they do not become toxic.
A famous international relations analogy likens states to billiard 
balls: unitary, unconstrained and functionally identical, zipping 
around the table, clicking against each other and bouncing off the 
cushions at predictable angles. This is a wholly inadequate description 
of the international system as it now operates, with states trailing 
people behind them, affecting the direction and pace of their movement. 
Diasporas are like ‘world wide webs’ emanating from states, with 
dense, interlocking, often electronic strands spanning the globe and 
binding different individuals, institutions and countries together. 
This Lowy Institute Paper follows those strands and describes the 
webs that they form.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In mid-2006, a newly elected Italian member of parliament walked into 
the Chamber of Deputies in the Palazzo Montecitorio in Rome for the 
fi rst time. As he passed beneath the fl ags of the Italian Republic and the 
European Union, the two Carabinieri standing guard at the door gave 
him a formal salute.
What was unusual about this scene was that the Italian MP in 
question, the On. Marco Fedi, is an Australian. He has lived in Australia 
for a quarter of a century, he has Australian children, and his family is 
based in Melbourne. Fedi serves in the Italian parliament – participating 
in Italian debates and voting on Italian laws – as a member of the Italian 
diaspora. Fedi is a representative, he says, of the Italian nation, which 
happens to extend beyond the borders of the Italian state. Thinking back 
later on that ‘amazing’ fi rst day, Fedi observed that Italy is ‘a nation as 
large as the world.’1
Diasporas have been with the world at least since the Jews were 
exiled to Babylonia. But in recent years they have become larger, thicker 
and stronger. Diasporas are the human face of globalisation. The 
story of Italy’s extraordinary electoral innovation in creating diaspora 
constituencies and electing diaspora MPs is only one of many examples 
of growing diaspora consciousness. In the arenas of economics, identity, 
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1.2 The rise of diasporas
The starting-point of this paper is that diaspora consciousness is on the 
rise – for individual diasporans, for homelands and for host countries. 
This argument is not often made about diasporas in general,9 but in fact 
it is supported by a large body of evidence. Diasporans have always felt 
memories of their past tugging at them, but in a globalised world the 
pull is, for many, getting stronger – and easier to satisfy. That people are 
becoming more interested in, and knowledgeable about, their original 
homelands (or that of their ancestors) is showing up in different indicia, 
such as the international news they follow, or the sporting teams they 
back, or the culture they consume. With China’s geopolitical rise, 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and the 
Philippines are taking renewed pride in their origins, studying Mandarin, 
participating in lion dances and reviving their old Chinese surnames.10 
‘Roots tourism’ is becoming an important niche market, seized on by 
countries such as Ghana, which is courting African-American and 
Afro-Caribbean11 tourists keen to undertake ‘pilgrimages’ to discover 
their ancestral cultures.12 In the world of football, the Los Angeles Times 
commented after a 1998 fi xture between the US national team and 
Mexico that ‘Playing in Los Angeles is not a home game for the United 
States’; similarly the Turkish team attracted large and enthusiastic 
crowds to matches it played recently on German grounds.13
Diaspora organisations such as New Zealand’s Kiwi Expat 
Association (KEA) and Australia’s Advance are coalescing in order 
to facilitate networking and mentoring among professionals; others 
are lobbying tenaciously for extended political rights.14 Latinos in 
southern California and elsewhere, especially from the fi rst and second 
generations, have formed hundreds of clubes de oriundos (hometown 
associations), which offer places to socialise and ways to promote 
development in the villages from which they or their parents set out 
for America.15 The Salvadoran-American head of one such committee 
told researchers: ‘I really live in El Salvador, not in LA... When I go 
back home to inspect the works paid with our contributions, I am as 
important as the mayor. In LA, I just earn money, but my thoughts 
politics and security, diasporas are acquiring a new international 
salience. This Lowy Institute Paper seeks to plot this intriguing growth 
curve and evaluate its implications.
1.1 The meaning of diaspora
The term ‘diaspora’ derives from the ancient Greek word diaspeirein, 
meaning to sow or scatter.2 It was used to describe Jews living in exile 
outside Israel, and the concept remains bound up with the Jewish 
tradition. Yet the word has come to be used much more broadly, and 
is now routinely applied to many different transnational communities, 
from Afghanis to Zimbabweans.3 
What is a diaspora? An ‘unruly crowd’ of possible defi nitions jostle 
for position, many of them exclusive, elaborate and quite theoretical.4 
Taken at its broadest, a diaspora is a self-identifi ed cultural community 
which has been dispersed from, but maintains links with, its place 
of origin.5 There are two important elements of this defi nition. First, 
diasporas are transnational: as Samuel Huntington puts it, they ‘cut 
across state boundaries’.6 Indeed, the homeland may not even presently 
constitute a state. Second, self-defi nition is key. The existence of 
a diaspora requires more than a mere population of expatriates. It 
requires members of a community to continue to identify with their 
homeland, and to cultivate ties both between themselves and with the 
homeland. Diasporas should not be thought of, I suggest, in terms of 
citizenship or the number of generations since emigration, but rather 
in terms of connectedness. Whether a sense of connectedness – and 
therefore membership of a diaspora – persists or evaporates over time 
depends partly on the cultures of the sending and receiving countries, 
but mainly on the individual.7 Certain other defi nitions in the literature 
refer to additional characteristics of some diasporas – a traumatic 
dispersal, for instance, or a troubled relationship with the host country, 
or the retention of original nationality – but these are not present in 
every case and should not be regarded as constitutive.8
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a ‘wave of Turkophilia’, including the performance of folk dances and 
national songs.22
The world is becoming aware of the awesome economic power 
of remittances: in 2006, for instance, recorded remittances totalled 
US$276 billion; including informal remittances, the total may be more 
than US$400 billion. About US$300 billion of these remittances went 
to developing countries. That is a very large number – almost as large 
as total foreign direct investment in developing countries and three 
times that of offi cial development assistance23 – and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are seeking to design policies that increase the 
quality and effect of these remittances. Businesses are identifying 
lucrative profi t-making opportunities. The one-time telegram giant 
Western Union has remade itself as the leading global provider of money 
transfer services, with 320,000 locations worldwide (and a record of 
advocating the liberalisation of America’s immigration policies).24 On 
Indian news portals, Citibank advertises its rupee checking accounts, 
money transfer facilities, calling cards and ATM cards for relatives 
back home. Satellite television channels such as Hindi language Zee 
TV and Chinese language Phoenix target their national diasporas; a 
new English-language satellite television news channel in Pakistan, 
DawnNews, has announced it will target second-generation Pakistanis 
living in the West whose Urdu is limited but whose emotional links 
with their country remain intact.25
Politicians are travelling the world stumping for the expatriate vote, 
among them French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who told an enthusiastic 
audience of French citizens in London (‘one of the biggest French cities’) 
during his successful election campaign that ‘France is an ideal and not 
just a territory... France exists anywhere in the world where there are 
French people.’ Indeed, Sarkozy seemed to argue that France could learn 
a lot from the entrepreneuralism and ‘vitality’ of her expatriates.26 
Home capitals, too, are trying to network with their diasporas. Heads 
of government are reaching out rhetorically; for example, New Zealand 
Prime Minister Helen Clark has said ‘our expatriates can see opportunities 
for us overseas through New Zealand eyes’.27 In 2006, Greek President 
Karolos Papoulias (who himself spent many years outside his homeland) 
are really back home.’16 These trends are only likely to accelerate in 
the future, as the exploding international interest in family trees and 
genealogical research is supplemented by ‘recreational genetics’ – new 
and affordable DNA techniques that enable individuals to trace their 
ancestors back to the continent (or even the region or tribe) from which 
they sprang.17 
The spike in diasporic feeling is also being expressed in the arts. The 
British Museum is fi nding that its visitors are increasingly interested 
in their own histories: exhibitions of Bengali and Ghanaian objects 
produced sharp rises in visitor numbers from those local communities.18 
Some of the fi nest novelists writing in English today, such as Kiran 
Desai, Rohinton Mistry, V. S. Naipaul and Salman Rushdie, are 
members of the Indian diaspora. Filmmakers such as Iranian-American 
Kayvan Mashayekh and French-Iranian Marjane Satrapi, British-
Indian Gurinder Chadha, French-Algerian Tony Gatlif and German-
Turk Fatih Akin, are creating fi lms that feature people negotiating their 
plural identities. Young German-Turkish rappers in Berlin are sampling 
traditional Turkish music and borrowing their lyric structures from 
traditional Turkish minstrels, producing a unique variant of hip-hop.19 
Multiple identities are good for the creative process, because as the art 
critic Robert Hughes has noted, ‘some of the most interesting things in 
history and culture happen at the interface between cultures.’ Those 
who live in what Hughes calls ‘border situations’ are often better placed 
to ‘read the image-banks of others.’20 
None of this amounts to ancestor worship; nevertheless, clearly 
something is happening.
There is also something important happening in homelands. Countries 
which long regarded their emigrants as second-raters, remittance drones 
or even traitors are now seeing them in a different light: as well-placed 
contacts, unoffi cial ambassadors and ‘gold-collar workers’. An avalanche 
of reports advocating closer engagement is falling from think tanks and 
parliamentary committees in countries such as Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand.21 In June 2007, Istanbul hosted the fi nals of the fi fth 
Uluslararası Tűrkçe Olimpiyatları (Turkish Language Olympics), which 
brought together Turkic language speakers from around the world on 
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Meanwhile, host countries such as the US are becoming increasingly 
aware of the transnational communities in their midst, as older groups 
such as the Cuban-Americans of Miami are joined by new communities 
such as the Iranian-Americans of ‘Teherangeles’, who include among 
their number the mayor of Beverly Hills.33 London is the world capital 
of several diasporas. Several hundred thousand Russians have swept 
into ‘Londongrad’ in the past decade, doing deals (often in cash), 
upsetting the Kremlin from time to time, and snapping up football clubs 
(such as Chelsea, or ‘Chelski’ as it became known once it was purchased 
by Roman Abramovich) and fancy residences. (Winston Churchill’s 
famous Westminster apartment, 11 Morpeth Mansions, is currently 
on the rental market: the details are available on the Internet in both 
English and Russian.)34 Since Poland’s accession to the European Union 
in 2004, London has seen a huge infl ux of Polish immigrants, who now 
form the third largest ethnic group in England. A ‘Polandia’ subculture 
has arisen, with Polish meatballs on sale at markets near Marble Arch 
and Polish newspapers for sale at London news stands.35 On the other 
hand, for some commentators London is not Londongrad or Polandia, 
but ‘Londonistan’, a hub for Islamists and a Petri dish for terrorism.36 
This kind of concern about fi fth columns, much heightened since the 
terror attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, has produced a fl urry of new laws to 
identify suspect individuals and organisations as well as new policies 
to promote cultural integration. Not coincidentally, perhaps, there is 
heightened concern about foreign lobbies bending national policy to 
their will, most notably the so-called ‘Israel lobby’ in the US. Identity 
issues such as veils, scarves and religious education are roaring back 
everywhere.
1.3 Reasons for the rise of diasporas
There are at least fi ve reasons for the new prominence and infl uence 
of diasporas, and all of them are connected with globalisation.37  The 
fi rst, and most obvious, is the substantial (although not necessarily 
unprecedented38) growth in the international movement of people. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates there that 
told visiting Greeks: ‘The Greek soul is a prerequisite for creativity. And 
you all carry it within you. Your heart beats Greek... you are almost a 
second Greece.’28 The Irish specialise in diaspora symbolism: in her own 
inaugural address, for instance, former Irish President Mary Robinson 
offered to represent everyone of Irish ancestry and to use her offi cial 
residence, Áras an Uachtaráin, as a venue for emigrant get-togethers; 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern has commented, ‘We view the Irish diaspora as 
a rich source of international infl uence and goodwill towards Ireland’.29 
Dublin has converted St Patrick’s Day, long an excuse to drink green beer 
and eat corned beef and cabbage, into a national marketing opportunity: 
on 17 March 2006, for instance, Irish ministers and politicians fanned 
out to St Patrick’s Day celebrations in 22 countries on fi ve continents.30 
Once a year, Philippines President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo goes to 
Manila Airport to personally greet returning overseas Filipino workers 
(OFWs), whom she calls ‘modern heroes’.31
Governments are establishing new institutions (of varying 
usefulness), giving expatriates the vote and extending to them more 
muscular consular protection. One of the more developed examples of 
expatriate engagement is the Indian case. Keen to tap the community 
of twenty-fi ve million overseas Indians, New Delhi established a High 
Level Committee on the phenomenon and initiated a raft of policy 
changes. The terms non-resident Indian (NRI) and person of Indian 
origin (PIO) are now in popular usage in India, and even though only 
NRIs actually retain their Indian citizenship, PIOs are now able to 
purchase a ‘PIO card’ entitling them to visa-free entry and some other 
benefi ts. Institutions compete to recognise prominent Indians abroad: 
Shashi Tharoor, India’s unsuccessful candidate for United Nations 
Secretary-General, was recently awarded the Government’s Pravasi 
Bharatiya Samman Award for the leading Indian abroad; but the readers 
of The Times of India decided that the ‘NRI of the Year’ was tycoon 
Laxmi Narayan Mittal. Finally, a gathering of Indian expatriates called 
the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Global Indian Day) is now convened in 
an Indian city each year on 9 January – the very date that the country’s 
most storied expatriate, M. K. Gandhi, returned to India in 1915 after 
spending two decades in South Africa.32
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show their children their ancestral homes and introduce them to 
their cousins, attend weddings and arrange new marriages, undertake 
religious pilgrimages and engage in diaspora tourism.44
Connectedness has grown exponentially, as the telegraph, the press, 
radio, television and transcontinental telephony have given way to 
computers, satellite television, the Internet, email, chat rooms, blogs, 
Internet telephony such as Skype, video-sharing sites such as YouTube, 
and social networking communities such as Facebook and MySpace. This 
trend, which has enabled information fl ows and interactions between 
people who are physically distant, has naturally enough benefi ted 
diaspora communities. British editor John O’Sullivan notes that this 
kind of technological progression ‘is not equal in its impact. It especially 
fosters cooperation among people who speak the same language and 
share the same cultural world… Its main international impact… is to 
elevate the importance of culture and downgrade that of geographical 
proximity.’45 Expatriates can use these technologies to keep up with the 
news from home, maintain the currency of their social networks, and 
do long-distance business deals. Young Australians living abroad, for 
instance, often read The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian 
online each day before anyone back home has woken up. NRIs use 
special matrimonial websites to fi nd brides and grooms back in India or 
within the diaspora.46 Armenians have established a ‘Global Armenians’ 
Facebook group which allows for participant interaction, discussion 
boards, photo-sharing and event notifi cation.47 (On the other side of the 
ledger, of course, people can use the technologies of globalisation for 
more sinister ends: Jihadists have moved into cyberspace, ‘the ultimate 
ungoverned territory’.48)
As well as transporting and connecting people, though, new 
technologies are also narrowing their vision, herding like-minded 
individuals towards each other. Diasporas have been at the leading edge 
of technological adoption because of the particular challenges arising 
from their dispersed audiences.49 Ethnic newspapers, music videos 
and online magazines have helped diasporas to maintain their distinct 
identities. In the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, Indians in Britain got 
their fi x of Hindi fi lms via video cassette; now Bollywood is, according 
were 191 million international migrants in 2005, which is more than 
a twofold increase since the 1960s. In other words, one in thirty-three 
people in the world is a migrant; the total number of migrants would, if 
gathered together, constitute the world’s fi fth most populous country.39 
According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA), in 2000 there were 70 countries 
where migrants accounted for 10% of the population; in six countries 
and regions they constituted more than 60% of the population.40 
Countries which once sent migrants abroad, such as Italy, Ireland and 
Turkey, are now receiving them; people are not only moving from poor 
to rich countries but between poor and middle income countries as 
well.41 As the social anthropologist Steven Vertovec notes, migration 
fl ows replenish old diasporas and create new ones.42 Given that 
diasporas are self-defi ned, and the necessary sense of connectedness 
will often linger well beyond the fi rst generation, the total membership 
of global diasporas, although impossible to quantify, would probably be 
signifi cantly larger than the number of migrants.
Second, the revolution in transport and communications technology is 
expanding the opportunities for people to live overseas, and quickening 
the pace of their interactions with their homelands. Of course, 
transnational activities have taken place for a long time, but the new 
technologies are transforming their intensity and scope.43 Technological 
developments are transporting people, connecting them, and sometimes 
narrowing them. The increasing ease and declining cost of transporting 
people around the world, in particular by airliner, has made the idea of 
one-off migration a thing of the past for many people. The establishment 
of low-cost carriers and the creation of new international air corridors 
between provincial cities in the past decade have further strengthened 
connections with homelands. For example, British Pakistanis can fl y 
direct from Manchester to Islamabad, and Sikhs and other Punjabis 
can take a direct service from Birmingham to Amritsar. Judith Brown 
observes that now ‘even relatively poor South Asians overseas travel 
back to the subcontinent, take their children there, and have a lively 
sense of belonging to families and wider kin groups which straddle 
national boundaries.’ When they are ‘home’, they visit their families, 
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to JPMorgan Chase, ‘waking up to the commercial potential of making 
movies for overseas Indians’. Companies such as Bollywood for You 
(B4U) are beaming Hindi fi lms to subscribers around the world, and 
the industry’s writers are now featuring NRIs among their leading 
characters.50 (In 2006 Western Union paid the producers of a Bollywood 
movie to include a scene in which one of their wire transfers saves the 
day.51) Satellite TV is the most powerful technology so far, because it 
enables expatriates to watch television routinely from their homelands 
and therefore ‘synchronise’ their lives with events at home. ‘It’s almost 
as if we’re living in Turkey, as if nothing really has changed for us’, 
one London resident told scholars.52 Indeed, the experience of Turks in 
Germany demonstrates all three technological effects of transportation, 
connection and narrowing. More than fi fty fl ights transport individuals 
between Turkey and Germany each day; email and diasporic websites 
connect German-Turks in Berlin and Cologne with their homeland; 
and satellite TV enables them to spend their evenings and weekends in 
narrowcast, talking to their families in Turkish and watching Turkish 
television. One scholar, Hakan Yilmaz, describes this as a ‘tremendous 
increase in transnational capabilities that is fundamentally altering our 
idea of the space in which people live.’53 
The Economist summarised the impact of new technologies on diasporas 
in this way:
Scatter a few million émigrés across the globe, and, 
being everywhere in a minority, they are weak. They 
are infl uential only where they are concentrated, as, 
say, Swedes are in southern Finland; or where they are 
especially well-organised, as Jews are in the United States 
and Armenians are in France. That is certainly the way it 
used to be. But nowadays jet planes, rapid communication 
and in particular the internet have enabled dispersed 
exiles to come together cheaply and effectively for the fi rst 
time in history.54
Closely related to these technological changes is a third reason for the 
emergence of diasporas: the places where we look for and fi nd our 
sense of identity seem to be changing. The hypothesis that globalisation 
would produce a global homogenised culture is proving partly right (we 
all read Harry Potter and shake our heads over Paris Hilton) but partly 
wrong. To be sure, many people’s horizons have been broadened by the 
cultural interactions that are possible nowadays. But partly as a reaction 
against the forces of globalisation, others are rethinking their identities 
and redefi ning them in what Huntington calls ‘narrower, more intimate, 
communal terms’. Technology allows individuals both to ‘mix with others’ 
and ‘huddle with their own’.55 The columnist David Brooks, among others, 
has identifi ed this trend in Western societies, where ‘far from converging 
into some homogenous culture, we are actually diverging into lifestyle 
segments’, downloading views with which we agree onto our iPods, and 
moving into neighbourhoods full of people just like ourselves.56 So it is 
on the international stage too. Since the end of the Cold War, political 
ideology no longer exerts the same power over the human imagination; old 
factors such as nationality, religion and ethnicity are proving remarkably 
durable and, arguably, actually increasing in salience – and not only 
in that part of the world where the Soviet writ once ran and ethnicity 
was systematically repressed. Contrary to the predictions of Karl Marx, 
H. G. Wells and a host of other thinkers, ethnic and religious identifi cation 
seems to be on the rise in many different regions.57
This does not necessarily mean we face a clash of civilisations; it does 
mean, though, that people searching for more ‘authentic’ identities may 
fi nd them in the folds of their memory or their ancestry. The New York 
Times recently reported on an Italian-American woman from California, 
Angela Paolantonio, who visited her grandparents’ village of Calitri in 
southern Italy on holiday. She ended up purchasing her grandmother’s 
childhood home and now divides her time between the village and Los 
Angeles. ‘I really didn’t know I was searching for anything till I got here’, 
said Paolantonio. ‘Then I realized what I was missing and what it meant.’58 
In a globalised world, it is easier for such dual or multiple identities to 
co-exist: for a German-Turk, for example, to have ‘one foot in his village, 
another in Istanbul, one hand in Cologne and the other in Mecca.’59
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1.4 The unmanageable diaspora
The story of diasporas is not a simple one, however. Even as diasporas 
become stronger, they become harder to control – including for the 
national governments whose policy decisions have accelerated their rise. 
States are becoming more interested in working with their diasporas, 
but many are struggling to do so effectively because it is outside their 
raison d’être, which is to monopolise legitimate authority within a 
delineated territory. The historian Charles Maier notes that nation-states 
consolidated themselves in the second half of the nineteenth century 
by fi lling their territories with prefectures, post offi ces, infrastructure 
and newspapers, stringing telegraph and telephone lines from border 
to border and criss-crossing their land with railroad lines. As a result, 
‘far more points within the state’s territory could be supervised by 
administrators, opened for economic exploitation, mobilized for 
national purposes.’ However, the last forty years have seen, to some 
extent, ‘the waning of territoriality’, as territory ‘fades in importance 
as a political and economic resource’,63 symbolised by the rise of the 
microchip and the fall of the twin towers. Without exaggerating the 
point, both prosperity and security increasingly derive from networks, 
not bounded spaces.
States are aware of this change and are trying to adapt – remodelling 
their economies, restructuring their militaries and, lately, reaching out 
to exploit (or protect) their people abroad. But these extra-jurisdictional 
efforts are often clunky and ineffective: it is very diffi cult for governments 
to know where their people are living and what they are doing, let alone 
to infl uence their behaviour. There is also clear cognitive dissonance, 
driven by anxiety about international people movements: thus Western 
countries such as Australia simultaneously make it harder for immigrants 
to obtain citizenship (by introducing tests and other requirements) 
and easier for emigrants to regain citizenship if they have lost it.64 The 
diaspora organisations which are springing up are nimbler than national 
governments but they, too, often fi nd it diffi cult to organise their fellows. 
The leaders of these groups are not always representative and often 
they are not even elected.65 Sometimes well-known groups amount to 
The end of the Cold War has reduced the global importance of ideology, 
but the shake-up that ensued has pushed diasporas to the fore in other 
ways, too. In the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, nationalism 
has returned in force; nations in Eastern Europe have moved their 
borders, altering the composition of their diasporas; democracy has 
spread, raising the issue of external voting in a more insistent fashion 
than before; the reshuffl ing of power politics that followed has changed 
host country attitudes towards certain homelands and the diasporas 
lobbying on their behalf (for example, US attitudes towards India and 
Indian-Americans); and rising powers boasting infl uential diasporas, 
such as China, have stepped forward.
Finally, the ability of people like the German-Turk mentioned above 
to live and do business across borders has been enabled by changes of 
policy by national governments. Although the trend is not universal, 
most countries have moved in the direction of opening their economies 
up to the world. The barriers to the international fl ow of people have 
not come down nearly so far as those to the fl ows of goods, services 
and capital. Nevertheless, the shift to a service economy has increased 
the value and tradability of human capital and created an international 
labour market, at least for the highly skilled.60 Just as governments have 
liberalised their economies, they have also practised more ‘diversity-
positive policies’ such as multiculturalism, which have made it ‘widely 
acceptable for immigrants and descendants to sustain culturally distinct 
practices and diasporic identities.’61 One of the most notable examples 
has been the widespread liberalisation of citizenship laws to allow for 
dual citizenship, sometimes after lobbying by diaspora organisations. 
(Sending countries have typically changed their laws in an effort to 
retain their emigrants’ loyalty; receiving countries have done so 
to ease the way of new immigrants and spare them diffi cult choices 
during their process of integration.) According to a recent estimate, the 
number of countries allowing dual citizenship to most of their citizens 
has more than doubled in the past twenty years; even countries that 
were previously quite fundamentalist about exclusive nationality, such 
as the US, are becoming less so.62
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– diasporic attachment may be, to some extent, a counterweight to 
integration66 – but it is also distinct from them. This paper is primarily 
about emigration, not immigration. While some chapters will explore 
how societies containing foreign diasporas organise themselves, the 
primary relationship under examination is that between diaspora and 
homeland, not diaspora and host country. Second, while this paper 
contains generalisations about various diasporas, they are of course 
not single-minded creatures. Diasporas are far from monolithic and 
different members relate very differently to their homelands. The Indian 
diaspora is divided not only by religion (Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Parsi 
and Christian) but also language, locality, caste and class; the Jewish 
diaspora contains both supporters and critics of Israel; the Turkish 
diaspora is just as diverse as Turkish society, including Kurds, Assyrians 
and Armenians, Alevis and Sunnis, conservatives and liberals, religious 
and secular Muslims.67 The effects of individual diasporans, therefore, 
are diverse.
A famous international relations analogy likens states to billiard 
balls: unitary, unconstrained and functionally identical, zipping around 
the table, clicking against each other and bouncing off the cushions 
at predictable angles. That analysis of states – each one ‘closed, 
impermeable, and sovereign’ – was always more parsimonious than 
accurate.68 Certainly, it is an inadequate description of the international 
system as it now operates, with states trailing people behind them, 
affecting the direction and pace of their movement. Diasporas are like 
‘world wide webs’ emanating from states, with dense, interlocking, often 
electronic strands spanning the globe and binding different individuals, 
institutions and countries together.69 This Lowy Institute Paper follows 
those strands and describes the webs that they form.
less than they fi rst appear: one government offi cial compares dealing 
with diaspora organisations to putting his hand into a pillar of smoke. 
In other words, diasporas are becoming more powerful and prominent – 
but no easier to marshal or direct.
1.5 Aim and scope of this Paper
The aim of this Lowy Institute Paper is to analyse the implications 
that fl ow from the strengthening of diasporas, for global economics, 
identity, politics, and security. Some of these effects are new; others 
have been around for a long time but are now manifesting in different 
ways. Diasporas raise some very diffi cult issues for policymakers, 
some of which will be aired in the chapters which follow. What are 
the economics of emigration and to what extent can remittances drive 
development? How are diasporas and homelands rethinking their 
relationships with each other? How are expatriates infl uencing the 
politics of their homelands and host countries, and what has been the 
response? What are the security implications of diasporas – are they 
recruiting sergeants for extremists and foreign intelligence services, or 
can they be mobilised to help rebuild their broken homelands? Finally, 
to turn the last question around, how can governments protect their 
people when they choose to live abroad? Over and above all these 
specifi c policy issues, what does the thickening of diasporas mean for 
nation-states and the international system?
If it is rare to look at diasporas from multiple analytical perspectives, 
the intention is to produce a three-dimensional view of the phenomenon. 
The paper also aims to help pull diasporas into the analytical mainstream 
by moving beyond the academic fi eld of diaspora studies and drawing on 
general economics, politics and security studies literatures. That is not 
to say this paper is comprehensive, or anything like it; on the contrary 
it is deliberately selective and synthetic. Certain interesting cases will 
receive particular attention, but the chapters are thematic and the aim 
is get a sense of the overall picture – and how that picture is changing.
Two caveats should be mentioned. First, the issue of diasporas is 
related to debates about immigration, multiculturalism and ethnicity 
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Demographics and diasporas
This chapter outlines briefl y some of the demographics of diasporas, by 
way of background for the real substance of this paper: the implications 
for global economics, identity, politics and security.
2.1 Counting diasporas
It is very diffi cult, if not impossible, to estimate accurately the size of the 
various diasporas. In the fi rst place, it is hard for homelands to follow 
their people’s movements once they leave their sovereign territory. Some 
foreign ministries direct their overseas posts to estimate the number of 
their nationals residing within the countries to which they are accredited, 
however these fi gures vary considerably in accuracy from place to place.70 
Second, host countries have widely varying ambitions and capacities to 
record the presence of foreign diasporans within their own borders. 
There are data problems arising from defi nitional ambiguities in the 
collection of information, the problem of illegal (and usually invisible) 
immigrants, and the inability of some developing countries to conduct 
thorough censuses. Furthermore, Gabriel Sheffer reminds us that ‘data 
politics’ also come into play, when governments attempt to minimise 
local awareness of diaspora populations for political, cultural or religious 
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members have undoubtedly been ‘indispensable contributors to 
mainland China’s spectacular economic growth.’79 In recent years there 
have been impressive new movements of ethnic Chinese into the lands 
on China’s periphery, including Burma (where experts believe a million 
Chinese may now reside), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Siberia – and 
further afi eld, to regions such as Africa and the Southwest Pacifi c. In 
some of these geographies there are now several quite distinct Chinese 
communities, for example, in Solomon Islands, where there are stark 
differences (and some friction) between the established waku (Chinese 
or Asian) community and the newer arrivals, who tend to be more 
nationalistic and sharper in their business practices.80 
According to the Indian government, there are over 25 million overseas 
Indians, including both NRIs and PIOs, spread across 110 countries, 
with particular concentrations in the Gulf region, North America, the 
UK, South Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacifi c, the Caribbean and East 
Africa.81 The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs estimates that about 
60% of that number are PIOs, that is, they are of Indian ancestry but 
do not hold Indian citizenship.82 Indian emigration began en masse 
in the nineteenth century in the form of indentured labour bound 
for Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, Sri Lanka, Fiji and East Africa; 
fi nanciers and traders conducting seaborne commerce in the wake of the 
British Empire; and Punjabi soldiers and police following the imperial 
fl ag.83 Three further waves have left since independence in 1947: 
professionals and small business people seeking greater opportunities 
in the West since the 1950s; contract workers heading for the Gulf since 
the 1970s oil boom; and IT professionals who have migrated to the US 
since the 1980s.84 If the Chinese diaspora is comprised largely of small 
businesspeople, the Indian diaspora is dominated by guestworkers at 
one end and professionals at the other – right up to the CEO of PepsiCo, 
Indra Nooyi.
There are Russians living in many parts of the world, including the 
US, Western Europe and Israel, but the largest number live on Russia’s 
own borders. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 25 million 
ethnic Russians living in the outlying Soviet regions were suddenly 
added to the ranks of the Russian diaspora – a diaspora towards which 
reasons.71 One scholar refers to France as a ‘dark country’, for example, 
in the sense that its Republican ethos prevents the collection of census 
data on the ethnicity of French citizens.72 In any case, the membership 
of diasporas is essentially unknowable, because it is not a simple issue 
of citizenship, race, religion or even ancestry: rather, it is a matter of 
self-identifi cation. Indeed, as we will explore in the next chapter, many 
individuals identify with two or more countries, and sometimes even 
with multiple diasporas. Accordingly, while the estimates of the size 
of various diasporas provided in this paper draw on the most reliable 
fi gures available, they should only be regarded as indicative.73
Notwithstanding these problems, we can state with confi dence that 
diasporas are large and they are growing. If there are almost two hundred 
million migrants in the world, as stated in the previous chapter, then we 
can expect the total number of people who feel a diasporic connection 
to another country to be larger than that fi gure, perhaps even a multiple 
of it.74 Four of the largest and most signifi cant diasporas are those 
attaching to China, India, Russia and Mexico.
An old saying has it that ‘there are Chinese people wherever the 
ocean waves touch.’75 Chinese emigration has been taking place for 
centuries – from the early artisans, traders and other skilled workers 
down through the free emigrants and contract labourers or coolies of 
the nineteenth century to the young contemporary professionals who 
leave China to study and work in the US. Today it is estimated that 
there are more than 33 million overseas Chinese (huaqiao) and people 
of Chinese ancestry (huayi) living outside mainland China, Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan.76 This diaspora77 can be found in more than 150 
countries but it is particularly prominent and wealthy in Southeast 
Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Malaysia, where Chinese run huge swathes of the private economy. 
Amy Chua claims that ‘no minority in Asia is, or has ever been, as 
stunningly wealthy or glaringly market-dominant as the ethnic Chinese 
communities of Southeast Asia, who collectively control virtually all 
of the region’s most advanced and lucrative industries as well as its 
economic crown jewels.’78 According to some analysts, the combined 
GDP of the Chinese diaspora is as large as that of China itself; its 
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were included;96 and the New Zealand diaspora, which though small 
in absolute terms (between one-half and one million), is large relative 
to New Zealand’s modest resident population of about four million.97 
A number of other diasporas are discussed in depth in later chapters 
of this paper. A summary of qualitative and quantitative data about 
selected diasporas is contained in Appendix 1.
Diasporas are big: they are also getting bigger. We can expect global 
diasporas to increase in size, for two reasons. The fi rst is the increase 
in diaspora consciousness described in Chapter 1, which is likely to 
lead to the persistence of ethno-national connectedness into future 
generations. Second, the immigration fl ows which form diasporas are 
likely to widen and quicken in the future. The World Bank predicts 
that the number of people wishing to migrate from developing to 
developed countries will rise over the next two decades, because of the 
huge economic incentive: after adjusting for purchasing power, wage 
levels in high-income countries are approximately fi ve times those of 
low-income countries for similar occupations. Furthermore, the wages 
earned go much further when they are remitted back to developing 
countries, where the prices of goods and services are much lower.98 
Additional factors are also likely to drive immigration growth:
About 31% of developing countries’ population is below 
the age of 14, compared with 18% in high-income 
countries. We can thus anticipate a large infl ux in the age 
categories most suitable for emigration, as lifetime earnings 
from migration tend to be largest for those emigrating 
early in their working life. The surge in immigration 
since the 1980s has established large diasporas in high-
income countries, which help to reduce the costs and 
risks of migration… The demand for immigrant services 
in high-income countries will also rise as the aging of the 
population shrinks the workforce and increases demand 
for services that immigrants can supply (such as nursing 
care). As income standards rise, the demand for other 
services that employ migrants (such as household and 
the Russian political parties are very attentive.85 (The community 
of Russians remaining in the Soviet Union’s successor states is an 
archetype of a ‘stranded minority’ or an ‘accidental diaspora’, which is 
brought into being through boundary changes.86) Moscow has identifi ed 
Russian émigrés as a potential source of immigrants for a country in 
a demographic death spiral: in his 2006 state of the nation address, 
President Vladimir Putin initiated a program which provides incentives 
for Russian ‘compatriots’ living abroad to return to the motherland.87
The Mexican diaspora, thought to consist of about 30 million people,88 
is unusual in its heavy concentration in one region of one neighbouring 
country, being the southwestern United States (especially California, 
Texas, Arizona and Colorado, as well as Illinois).89 Many Mexican-
Americans speak Spanish and celebrate certain Mexican holidays, and 
the Catholic Church remains a mainstay of the community. Mexican 
migration to the US during the twentieth century, much of which was 
illegal, was mainly characterised by unskilled rural workers seeking 
higher wages, although observers believe there has been a shift recently 
towards more highly educated and skilled people.90 
In addition to the ‘big four’, of course, there are many other diasporas, 
all of which have their own features: for example, the Filipino diaspora, 
eight million strong, scattered around North America, the Gulf, East 
Asia and Europe, which is profoundly important to the Philippines 
economy;91 the Cuban diaspora, dominated by the 1.5 million Cuban-
Americans (predominantly clustered in southern Florida, where they 
have created an idealised Havana in Miami, including parks named for 
anti-Castro freedom fi ghters and Cuban botanicas, restaurants and cigar 
factories) who have exerted signifi cant infl uence over American policy 
towards Fidel Castro’s Cuba;92 the Lebanese diaspora, a mercantile 
community spread across North and South America, Europe, West 
Africa and Australia;93 the Greek diaspora, situated predominantly in 
North America, Australia and Europe;94 the British diaspora, which 
consists of 5.5 million people if one includes only British nationals 
but at least ten times that number, and perhaps many more, if one 
adds those claiming British ancestry;95 the Irish diaspora, which could 
boast seventy million people if all individuals claiming Irish descent 
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‘Gold-collar’ workers are, then, globalisation’s children. They are 
rarely forced to leave their homeland; rather, they are participants in 
a globalising labour market, choosing to take up opportunities where 
they fi nd them. Indeed, for many gold-collar workers, the idea of one-
off, one-way ‘emigration’ is redundant; they are highly mobile and 
are likely to relocate several times over the course of their lives.105 
Australians abroad form one example of a gold-collar diaspora. Its 
membership of approximately one million people is relatively young, 
well educated, well remunerated, well connected and highly mobile 
(in addition to being well disposed to Australia).106 Indeed, the roll-call 
of Australians in infl uential international positions has raised some 
eyebrows: one former US State Department offi cial refers jocularly to 
an ‘axis of ocker’, and Australians’ success on the British arts scene 
(where they lead London’s Southbank Centre, Sadler’s Wells Theatre, 
the London Philharmonic Orchestra, Wales Millennium Centre, the 
Edinburgh International Festival, and the English National Opera) led 
to a terrifi c whinge from the critic Norman Lebrecht, titled ‘Why do so 
many Aussies run the show?’107 
This new pattern of gold-collar movement is having an impact on the 
economics of emigration.
restaurant help) should grow rapidly. The intensifying 
competition for skilled workers may also draw migrants, 
especially from countries with strong systems of higher 
education.99
In other words, both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors are likely to expand global 
diasporas in the future.
2.2 Gold-collar diasporas 
Social scientists in the fi eld of migration studies have developed various 
typologies of diasporas. One such framework, proposed by Robin 
Cohen, focuses on the reason for dispersal and includes victim diasporas 
(such as the Jews, Africans and Armenians), labour diasporas (such as 
the Indians), imperial diasporas (most notably the British, but also the 
Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, German and French) and trade diasporas 
(such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Lebanese in West Africa 
and the Americas).100 To this list we could add another, more recent, 
type: the ‘gold-collar diaspora’, comprising highly skilled individuals.
The international migration of highly skilled people is, as the OECD 
has declared, ‘on the rise.’101 Between 1990 and 2000, for instance, the 
number of highly educated people from developing countries who were 
residing in OECD countries doubled.102 This shift has been enabled by 
the various manifestations of globalisation: rapid technological change; 
more robust market competition; the global shift to a service economy; 
the internationalisation of education and declining cost of international 
job searching. Furthermore, economic change has begat policy change, 
as the immigration policies of countries such as Australia, Canada, the 
US and some EU member states have begun to formally privilege highly 
skilled workers.103 The result of all this has been what Bimal Ghosh 
describes as ‘a worldwide scramble for skills’ and the consulting fi rm 
McKinsey & Company dubbed ‘the war for talent’.104 This scramble 
continues even after people have moved on: international fi rms are now 
following the lead of universities in devising means of staying in touch 
with their ‘alumni’. 
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Chapter 3
Brain drains, bridges and fl ying money: 
The economics of  emigration
Economic theory tells us that a diaspora can have very signifi cant 
implications, both positive and negative, for its homeland. The usual 
prism through which the topic is discussed is that of brain drain versus 
remittances: on the one hand, emigration can reduce an economy’s 
human capital and hence its growth prospects; on the other, a diaspora 
can be a critical source of foreign income. To this dichotomy we need to 
add an emerging argument about the value of diaspora networks, which 
can help connect domestic businesses with international sources of 
trade, investment and knowledge. What follows is not a comprehensive 
account of the economic effects of international migration,108 but rather 
a snapshot of each of these three elements.
3.1 Brain drains, real and imagined
In a strict economic sense, brain drain merely denotes ‘the international 
transfers of human resources’109 – but in the wider community the 
term is inevitably used in a pejorative way. The brain drain argument 
was popularised in the 1960s,110 but it has since been reinvigorated by 
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circulation’ among developed countries, rather than brain drains from 
them.117 Australia is a classic example where, notwithstanding media 
hype, immigration fl ows substantially exceed emigration fl ows and 
there is considerable churning of the diaspora’s membership.118
The situation is different for many developing countries, however. 
Although some research indicates that the prospect of emigration may 
foster human capital formation in developing countries (as individuals 
interested in making their fortune abroad invest more in education), 
most experts emphasise the effect on the homeland’s economic 
growth and other negative externalities such as lost tax revenue and 
contributions to national public goods.119 The mitigating factors which 
apply to developed countries do not necessarily apply to the same extent 
to developing countries: highly educated people are relatively scarcer 
in poor countries, for instance, and the impact of emigration on the 
stock of human capital is less likely to be tempered by immigration. 
A recent study by Frédéric Docquier and Abdeslam Marfouk found ‘a 
remarkable increase in the brain drain in the past decade’ in some parts 
of the world. Countries in the Caribbean, Central America and Africa 
are enduring the highest emigration rates; in some small states such 
as Suriname and Guyana, more than 80% of the potential educated 
labour force lives overseas. Even leaving aside these small countries, 
the authors found ‘tremendous rates of emigration’ from places such as 
Haiti, Somalia, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Madagascar, 
Vietnam and Lebanon.120 (See Table 2 below.) Ghosh points to some 
other extreme statistics: there are nearly four times as many Jamaicans 
with tertiary education in the US than in Jamaica; more Ethiopian 
doctors are practising medicine in Chicago than in Ethiopia.121 In 
these kinds of (admittedly atypical) cases, the loss of talent through 
emigration is likely to result in a major reduction in human capital, 
imposing a signifi cant cost on those left behind.
two developments. The fi rst of these was empirical, namely the sharp 
increase in the mobility of highly skilled individuals described in the 
previous chapter. The second development was theoretical: the rise 
of ‘endogenous growth theory’. Whereas traditional growth theory 
suggests that countries with more educated workers will tend to have 
higher levels of output per worker, new growth theory goes further 
and posits that increases in human capital may lead to higher rates of 
growth of output per worker, not just higher levels.111 It argues that the 
productivity of human capital relates positively to the availability of 
other human capital; for example, scientists are more likely to generate 
new ideas when they have physical contact with lots of other scientists. 
The implication is that there could be substantial damage to a country’s 
economic performance and development prospects if it loses ‘too much’ 
human capital overseas.112
Judging from media reports, many developed countries believe 
their brains are draining away, as local talent departs to join offshore 
diasporas. In countries such as Britain, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand and 
Australia, the brain drain narrative has proven irresistible to opposition 
politicians, university administrators and CEOs.113 According to 
Australian commentators, for example, the antipodean brain drain is 
‘real and… growing’ and is ‘sapping Australia’s energy’; it ‘has reached its 
most critical level’ and may eventually ‘cripple us’.114 In fact, sometimes 
even the US – typically the villain in the story – is open to the argument 
that it is actually a victim of brain drain.115 From an empirical point of 
view, however, wealthy countries such as these rarely face meaningful 
shortfalls in human capital, for two reasons. First, they usually have 
an excess supply of skilled migrants from developing countries wishing 
to immigrate, and these infl ows of skilled workers typically more than 
offset their outfl ows. In Canada, for instance, there are four times as 
many university graduates entering Canada from the rest of the world as 
there are leaving Canada for the US.116 Second, a signifi cant proportion 
of skilled migrants from developed countries return to their homeland 
after a period away, often with enhanced human capital in the form of 
new skills, experience and contacts. These two factors – immigration 
infl ows and return migration – point to an emerging pattern of ‘brain 
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very diffi cult. Furthermore, if employment opportunities in wealthy 
countries (especially in Europe) increase in the future, as many expect, 
poor countries’ brain drains may become even more pronounced.122
3.2 Remittances and development
The second factor to consider in assessing the economic impact of 
diasporas is the fi nancial fl ows that return to homelands, often in 
the form of remittances. If emigration can hurt a country’s economy, 
funds remitted by its diaspora can provide a valuable source of external 
fi nancing. Until very recently, says one observer, ‘remittances were 
considered small potatoes, and possibly rotten ones. Experts saw them 
as minor amounts, “wasted” on consumption, and to the extent they 
originated with professionals, reminders of the brain drain.’123 However, 
interest in the subject has surged in the last fi ve to ten years in light 
of the extraordinary sums involved, as well as the emerging evidence 
that remittances can contribute substantially to economic development. 
One indicator of this increased focus is the dedication of the World 
Bank’s prominent annual Global economic prospects report in 2006 to 
the ‘economic implications of remittances and migration.’ Similarly, the 
IOM observes that ‘Diaspora is fast emerging as one of the forces for 
development in the globalizing world.’124
Remittance fl ows are very large indeed. According to Dilip Ratha 
of the World Bank, global recorded remittances in 2006 reached 
US$276 billion, with the bulk of them (US$206 billion) going to 
developing countries.125 This is likely to be a signifi cant underestimate 
of total remittances, however, since many remittances go unrecorded 
in national statistics. Rather than being transferred via offi cial bank 
channels, they are carried home by the migrants themselves, sent 
back with relatives and friends, or transmitted via private systems 
such as Islamic hawala brokers, Chinese fei ch’ien (fl ying money) or 
the Filipino pakidala system.126 Model-based estimates and household 
surveys suggest that informal fl ows could add at least 50%, and perhaps 
more, to the offi cial estimates127 – which means that global remittances 
are actually likely to be in the vicinity of US$400 billion, with about 
Table 1: Top emigration countries of tertiary-educated workers, 2000 
(as % of total tertiary-educated in the country) 
20 highest rates – all countries
20 highest rates – countries 
with population > 4 million
Suriname 89.9% Haiti 81.6%
Guyana 85.9% Somalia 58.6%
Jamaica 82.5% Ghana 42.9%
Haiti 81.6% Mozambique 42.0%
Trinidad and Tobago 78.4% Sierra Leone 41.0%
Tonga 74.2% Vietnam 39.0%
Saint Kitts and Nevis 71.8% Nigeria 36.1%
Antigua and Barbuda 70.9% Madagascar 36.0%
Cape Verde 69.1% El Salvador 31.5%
Grenada 66.7% Nicaragua 30.9%
Samoa 66.6% Lebanon 29.7%
The Gambia 64.7% Croatia 29.4%
Barbados 61.4% Cuba 28.9%
Dominica 58.9% Hong Kong 28.7%
Fiji 58.7% Papua New Guinea 28.2%
Seychelles 58.6% Sri Lanka 27.5%
Somalia 58.6% Kenya 26.3%
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines
56.8% Angola 25.6%
Malta 55.2% Senegal 24.1%
Belize 51.0% Honduras 21.8%
Source: Docquier and Marfouk, ‘Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers’, 
Table 3, p 32. 
Whether and to what extent a country is suffering from a deleterious 
brain drain is an empirical question. In general, though, the outlook 
for developed countries is more optimistic than a reading of the 
press would indicate; for some developing countries, the situation is 
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Remittances overwhelmingly travel from wealthy countries to poorer 
countries (although there are also considerable South-South remittance 
fl ows originating in countries such as the Russian Federation, 
Malaysia and China).131 In 2006, the top remittance-sending country 
– by a wide margin – was the US (US$42.8 billion), followed by Saudi 
Arabia (US$14.3 billion), Switzerland (US$13.9 billion) and Germany 
(US$12.3 billion).132 The top recipient countries in absolute terms were 
India (US$24.6 billion), Mexico (US$24.5 billion), China (US$22.5 
billion) and the Philippines (US$14.9 billion).133 To take India as an 
example, remittances to that country have nearly doubled since 2001;134 
in 2005 they exceeded all FDI, ODA and portfolio equity fl ows to that 
country put together.135 However, it is not only large countries such 
as India which benefi t: as Ratha argues, ‘smaller and poorer countries 
tend to receive relatively larger remittances in proportion to the size 
of their economies.’136 If we express remittances as a share of GDP, the 
top recipients in 2006 were Moldova (30%), Tonga (27%), Guyana 
(22%) and Haiti (21%).137 The absolute and relative rankings are set 
out below in Figure 2.
Remittances are, in other words, a big deal. As Ratha observes: 
‘Remittances exceed 10% of GDP in 22 developing countries. They 
are larger than capital fl ows in 36 developing countries; merchandise 
exports in 12 countries; and the largest single commodity exports in 28 
countries. They are larger than foreign direct investment in Mexico, tea 
exports in Sri Lanka; tourism revenue in Morocco; and the revenue from 
the Suez Canal in Egypt.’138 The Philippines, where annual remittances 
constitute about one-eighth of GDP, is the example par excellence, as 
described in The New York Times Magazine:
With about one Filipino worker in seven abroad at any 
given time, migration is to the Philippines what cars once 
were to Detroit: its civil religion. A million Overseas 
Filipino Workers – OFWs – left last year, enough to fi ll six 
747s a day. Nearly half the country’s 10-to-12 year olds say 
they have thought about whether to go. Television novellas 
plumb the migrants’ loneliness. Politicians court their 
three-quarters of that sum going to poor countries. (Indeed, in October 
2007, the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development and 
the Inter-American Development Bank estimated that, including the 
hidden fl ows, migrants remitted US$301 billion, in 1.5 billion separate 
fi nancial transactions, to developing countries in 2006.128)
Such amounts are very signifi cant when compared to other sources 
of external fi nance such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and offi cial 
development assistance (ODA).  Remittances to developing countries are 
likely to be almost as great as FDI fl ows and perhaps three times the world’s 
combined foreign aid budgets; even if we limit our analysis to recorded 
fl ows, remittances represent two-thirds the value of FDI and twice that of 
ODA. Furthermore, these sums are surging: remittance fl ows to developing 
countries have doubled in size in the past fi ve years and increased by six 
times since 1990.129 (See Figure 1 below.) Some of this reported growth is 
due to depreciation of the US dollar and some of it refl ects more accurate 
data recording by banks and closer scrutiny since 9/11, but the underlying 
factor is the burgeoning migration to wealthy countries.130
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006e
Figure 1
Recorded remittances and other financial flows to 
developing countries
US$ billion
0
50
100
150
200
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300
350
Recorded remittances 
Foreign direct investment
Overseas development assistance
Source: Spreadsheet provided by Dilip Ratha, drawing on World Bank, Global development finance 2007 
and IMF, Balance of payments statistics yearbook 2006.
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Remittances are by no means a complete answer to underdevelopment. 
We do not really know the effect of remittances on economic growth; 
they may cause currency appreciation; and they do not necessarily 
reduce inequality within recipient countries. Critics argue that they 
create dependency, letting bad governments off the hook and removing 
the incentive to reform their broken economies.140 Furthermore, we 
have to consider the debilitating social costs often paid by migrants 
and those they leave behind, which show up in no balance of payments 
statistics: loneliness and isolation, infi delity, absent parents and 
splintered families. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of evidence 
that remittances form an important piece of the development puzzle. 
Because they are personal fl ows, remittances tend to be well targeted; 
they are largely immune from the governance issues involved with 
offi cial aid; research indicates that they have reduced poverty in 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South Asia; they 
can improve a country’s creditworthiness and expand access to capital; 
and they are more stable than private capital fl ows and may even be 
counter-cyclical, rising during periods of crisis and confl ict (for example, 
Lebanon and Haiti), natural disasters (for example, Central America 
after Hurricane Mitch) and state failure (for example, Somalia). This 
ability of remittances to avoid the herd-like behaviour of other capital 
fl ows, which can amplify the destructive cycle of boom and bust, has 
led one development economist to describe them as ‘the single most 
important source of insurance for many poor countries.’141
It is not surprising, then, that policymakers are searching for ways 
to maximise the developmental impact of remittances. Some developed 
countries – New Zealand and Australia, for instance – are being urged 
to establish foreign diasporas within their own borders in order to create 
remittance fl ows to neighbouring developing states in the Pacifi c.142 In the 
short term, however, the most obvious reform would be the reduction of 
remittance fees and costs, which are, as the World Bank observes, ‘high, 
regressive and nontransparent’. Service providers usually charge a fee of 
10-15%, and sometimes more, to handle the small remittances typically 
made by poor migrants. Increasing competition in the remittance market 
would help reduce these scandalous imposts and, according to survey 
votes. Real estate salesmen bury them in condominium 
brochures. Drive by the Central Bank during the holiday 
season, and you will fi nd a high-rise graph of the year’s 
remittances strung up in Christmas lights.139
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For example, Rauch and Trindade found that ethnic Chinese networks 
have a notable quantitative impact on international trade by helping 
to match buyers and sellers.151 Head and Reis found that immigration 
to Canada expanded trade fl ows between Canada and the sending 
countries.152 Saxenian has described the role played by Taiwanese, 
Indian and Chinese engineers in Silicon Valley, arguing that they have 
built bridges to their home countries and contributed to the growth of 
their domestic IT sectors.153 
Second, a diaspora can help to mobilise other balance of payments 
flows aside from remittances and trade. Overseas networks can be 
an important source of investment, whether directly, in the form of 
emigrants investing in their home economies (about which they will 
often possess useful knowledge) or indirectly, where they infl uence 
other investors’ decisions. There is anecdotal evidence, for instance, of 
Indians working at multinational corporations such as Hewlett-Packard 
infl uencing company decisions on where to base new operations, and 
studies have pointed to the importance of the overseas Chinese in 
promoting investment into China and Taiwan.154 Diasporas are also an 
emerging source of philanthropic funds for home towns and causes in 
sending countries.155
Finally, given the mobility of highly-skilled people in particular, there 
is always the possibility of migrants returning home to match their 
internationally-acquired skills and contacts with their understanding 
of the indigenous culture. For example, India is currently enjoying 
something of a ‘reverse brain drain’: tens of thousands of Indian 
technology professionals with education or experience in the US and 
Europe are returning to live in Bangalore, Hyderabad, New Delhi 
and other Indian cities in order to cash in on the thrusting Indian 
economy.156
Network benefi ts are harder to quantify than the effects of brain drain 
and remittances, but they are real and important. Certainly, national 
governments are attracted by the idea of tapping the economic power of 
their diasporas, as evidenced by the profusion of expatriate-only foreign 
currency accounts, tax exemptions and so on.157 However, the track 
record here is mixed. Emigrants are no more susceptible than anyone 
data, encourage migrants to remit more.143 Lower prices in the formal 
channels would also bring more migrants into contact with the formal 
fi nancial sector, which would contribute to a second aim: the creation 
of a ‘banking culture’ among poor migrants. Remitting money via bank 
deposits (rather than cash in hand or in the post) is likely to encourage 
saving and prudent investments. Corporations are, to some extent, 
stepping up to provide these services in a more convenient way: for 
example, micro-fi nance specialists are now offering innovative fi nancial 
instruments, such as cross-border mortgages, and communications 
companies are developing payment systems using new platforms such as 
the Internet and mobile phone messaging.144 Finally, humanitarians are 
considering ways to increase the fl ow of remittances to crisis situations, 
such as immigration reforms to allow remitting migrants to return to 
their homelands at times of crisis without jeopardising their right to 
return to their host countries.145
3.3 Diaspora networks: From brain drain to brains trust
The third factor requiring consideration is the advantage which 
may accrue to a home economy from its expatriates’ international 
linkages. The World Bank has argued that ‘a large, well-educated 
diaspora’ can improve ‘access to capital, information, and contacts 
for fi rms in countries of origin.’146 As cheaper and quicker transport 
and communications close the gap between diasporas and homelands, 
the extent to which skills are actually ‘lost’ with migration may be 
reduced.147 Ghosh suggests that ‘the new global changes are gradually 
shifting skill migration away from its fi xed, unidirectional pattern, 
which, in the past, generally resulted in a permanent loss of talent for 
the home country, into a new transnational model of skills sharing.’148
Recent research has pointed to a number of network benefi ts fl owing 
from diasporas.149 First, there is good evidence that people living in a 
country other than their own can stimulate bilateral trade between 
the two markets. Immigrants’ ties to their homelands, including their 
knowledge of home country markets, languages, preferences and 
business contacts, can reduce transaction costs and facilitate trade.150 
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Chapter 4
We are all mixobarbarians now: 
Diasporas and identity
This chapter describes how diasporic identities – diasporas’ view of 
themselves – are changing, and along with that how both homelands 
and host countries are altering their perceptions of the diasporas with 
which they interact. These changes are illustrated in the cases of the 
Jewish, Israeli and Turkish diasporas.
4.1 Diasporans and their homelands
‘Identity can be a complicated matter’, observes Amartya Sen with studied 
understatement. ‘In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of 
a variety of groups – we belong to all of them. The same person can be, 
without any contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, 
with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a 
long-distance runner, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, 
a heterosexual, a believer in gay and lesbian rights, a theatre lover, an 
environmental activist, a tennis fan, a jazz musician, and someone who 
is deeply committed to the view that there are intelligent beings in outer 
space with whom it is extremely urgent to talk (preferably in English)… 
else (indeed, they are probably less so) to brave claims by governments 
about their expertise in managing the economy. Government programs 
are all well and good, but investment will not fl ow if the home economy 
does not provide the usual requirements of macroeconomic stability, 
reasonable infrastructure, good governance and a favourable investment 
climate.158 Similarly, initiatives to encourage return migration have 
not achieved signifi cant success, because relatively small fi nancial 
incentives are unlikely to sway such important life decisions.159 Paying 
prodigal sons and daughters to come home is more likely to make 
taxpayers resentful than it is to attract the right sort of return migrant. 
We will return to this theme of governments’ inaptitude for infl uencing 
diaspora behaviour in the next chapter.160
It is not possible, of course, to calculate the overall economic impact of 
diasporas simply by adding the benefi ts from remittances and expatriate 
networks and deducting the effect of the brain drain. A diaspora’s effect 
on its homeland will vary from country to country and from time to 
time. We can say, however, that the economic implications of emigration 
are signifi cant and likely to grow in the future and that the news is not 
always bad for sending countries.
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attached to the countries of their birth, who form their own diaspora 
organisations and who sometimes live amongst each other, such as the 
South Africans of Ra’anana (or ‘Ra’ananfontein’). There are senior 
Israeli offi cials – among them a lawyer from Melbourne who works for 
the foreign minister and an Australian convert to Judaism who advises 
the Israeli prime minister on the Jewish diaspora, of all things – who 
consider themselves (alongside other affi liations) to be members of the 
Australian diaspora.
These people’s diasporic affi liations are not necessarily their primary 
identity: for some it is at the core of their perceptions of themselves; for 
others it is more marginal. For many people, identity is more situational 
than hierarchical: they ‘switch on’ their multiple identities at different 
points, depending on their activities, their location and their company.164 
However the kinds of phenomena recounted in Chapter 1 indicate that 
the relative salience of diasporic identifi cation is increasing: that many 
people are laying greater stress on this aspect of their identities. If, as 
Maalouf writes, ‘every individual is a meeting ground for many different 
allegiances’,165 then diasporic allegiances are visiting the meeting ground 
more regularly, and staying for longer periods.
4.2 Homelands and their diasporas 
Just as diasporans’ views of themselves are changing, so are homelands’ 
views of their diasporas. In those countries where a stigma once 
accompanied the practice of emigration, it seems to be disappearing. 
One fi nds a consistent story emerging, as homeland governments – alert 
to the need to keep pace with globalisation – redefi ne emigrants, who 
may once have been regarded as runaways or deserters, as friends and 
supporters. Thus Cuban emigrants, for example, are no longer gusanos 
(worms) but the ‘Cuban community abroad’; Mexican emigrants, once 
pochos (rotten fruit), are now a ‘very important’ part of the Mexican 
nation, which ‘extends beyond the territory enclosed by its borders.’166 
In 2002, the then Mexican President Vicente Fox – who was himself 
criticised by his political opponents for providing insuffi cient support 
to undocumented Mexican emigrants to the US – told a crowd of 
Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously 
belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be 
the person’s only identity or singular membership category.’161 
National identity certainly deserves its inclusion in this list of non-
exclusive attachments. It has always been elastic. The Mughal rulers of 
India dressed the walls of their private apartments in Delhi’s Red Fort 
with beautiful stone inlays of irises and other fl owers that reminded 
them of their origins in distant Central Asia. The Straits Chinese in 
Southeast Asia merged Chinese and Malay customs (as well as those of 
their colonial masters) in their distinctive ‘Peranakan’ culture, which 
features its own language, dress and cuisine. Byzantine authors wrote 
about ‘mixobarbarians’, who were neither Hellenes nor barbarians 
but instead had qualities of both. Mixobarbarians made their lives on 
the frontiers of the empire, worshipping and trading in Greek in the 
morning and riding horses with barbarians in the afternoon.162
This elasticity has been further stretched by the effects of globalisation 
that were described in Chapter 1. Many more of us now live in frontier 
regions – both physical and virtual – and hold dual or even multiple 
overlapping national identities. We are all mixobarbarians now: the 
British Pakistani in Bradford; the Irish-American in South Boston; 
the Chinese businessman in Nuku’alofa in Tonga; the Vietnamese-
Australian in the Sydney suburb of Cabramatta; the Indian Sikh 
living in the mini-Punjab of Yuba City, California. Bekir Alboğa is a 
German-Turkish activist in Cologne, who dreams in Arabic, German 
and Turkish: his wife tells him he’s Germanic in his approach to life, 
but when he is with other Turkish Muslims he feels very Turkish. 
On the other side of the Rhine, the writer Amin Maalouf imagines a 
young man born in France of Algerian parents who ‘carries within him 
two different allegiances or “belongings”… For the sake of argument 
I refer to two “belongings”, but in fact such a youth’s personality is 
made up of many more ingredients. Within him, French, European and 
other western infl uences mingle with Arab, Berber, African, Muslim 
and other sources, whether with regard to language, beliefs, family 
relationships or to tastes in cooking and the arts.’163 Even in Israel, the 
locus of the Jewish diaspora, one fi nds many immigrants who remain 
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agreed that expatriates ‘too often delight in running Australia down 
from offshore.’171 The rhetoric from Canberra also changed markedly. 
A bipartisan Senate Committee published a supportive report, the 
Opposition urged action, and fi nally, in a speech to a summit of 
leading expatriates in December 2006, Mr Howard declared that ‘it is 
enormously to Australia’s advantage that we have a talented, energetic, 
achieving, highly successful diaspora…. This is a country of all the 
talents in all parts of the world’.172
4.3 Host countries and their diasporas
Host countries’ views of the diasporas living within their borders – 
especially Muslim diasporas – are also changing, but in the opposite 
direction. The anxiety triggered by the al-Qaeda attack of 11 September 
2001 has been sustained by a series of other incidents: the bombings 
by Jihadist terrorists in Bali in 2002 and 2005, Madrid in 2004 and 
London in 2005; isolated crimes by Muslims such as the murder of 
Dutch fi lmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004; and social unrest such as 
the riots in the French banlieues (outskirts) in late 2005, which were 
actually driven by anger at living conditions rather than religion – as 
one scholar put it, they were ‘about Marx, not Bin Laden’ – but which 
involved young Muslims.173
These events have led to outbreaks of ‘diasporaphobia’174 throughout 
the Western world. Multicultural London has been compared to ‘the 
Star Wars bar scene’, and commentators have issued dark warnings 
about Muslim demographic aggression in ‘Eurabia’, with statistics 
often cited about the popularity of the name ‘Muhammed’ for newborn 
boys in various European countries.175 As late as November 2005, for 
instance, the columnist Mark Steyn claimed that he was more optimistic 
about the future of Iraq and Pakistan than he was about Holland and 
Denmark.176 Alongside this hysteria, though, legitimate concerns have 
been raised about ‘parallel societies marked by linguistic separateness, 
discrete neighbourhoods, schools, places of worship, associations and 
spaces of leisure.’177 A lively scholarly discussion is occurring on the 
relationship between transnationalism and integration.178 Debates 
thousands of Mexican-Americans in Fresno, California that they were 
his ‘heroic countrymen’: ‘You are the cultural engine, the permanent 
ambassadors of Mexican culture.’167
Australia provides a good example of this progression. For many 
years, Australians had a complicated relationship with their émigrés, 
especially those who left the country in the 1960s and found success 
and prominence in Britain and the US. Resident Australians displayed 
equal amounts of pride in their accomplishments and resentment at 
any public comments they might make on Australian affairs. Any 
prominent expatriates who poked their heads above the parapet were 
liable to have them shot off. After one such incident in 2000, for 
instance, when the distinguished New York-based critic Robert Hughes 
was under the gun, commentators complained of ‘expatriatitis’ and 
stated that ‘loudmouth expatriates’ (who would be more accurately 
styled ‘ignorant foreigners’) should ‘learn to listen to what those in this 
country have to say.’168 In 2004, when the London-based writer and 
controversialist Germaine Greer published an article that was critical 
of Australian culture, the then Prime Minister John Howard described 
her comments as ‘patronising’ and ‘elitist’, concluding, ‘if she wants to 
stay in another country, good luck to her.’169
In the last couple of years, however, the tone of Australia’s national 
conversation about its expatriates has been shifting. A number of major 
reports were published, including one by the Lowy Institute which 
argued that ‘the Australian diaspora represents a market, a constituency, 
a sales force and an ambassadorial corps’ and urged that the country 
‘engage the diaspora in our national life and create a global community 
of Australians.’170 In 2004, the Lowy Institute commissioned opinion 
polling which demonstrated not only that Australians were not in the 
grip of ‘foreign poppy syndrome’ (a new and more virulent strain of 
the ‘tall poppy syndrome’, Australians’ traditional suspicion of high-
fl yers and big-noters), but that Australians were remarkably sanguine 
about their non-resident countrymen and women. For example, 91% of 
respondents agreed that expatriates are ‘adventurous people prepared 
to try their luck and have a go overseas’, whereas only 10% believed 
expatriates ‘have let us down by leaving Australia’ and only 14% 
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identities: as one critic has suggested, many immigrants are ‘paper 
French’, not ‘wholeheartedly French.’185 Timothy Garton Ash is correct 
in arguing that neither ‘live-and-let-die separatist multiculturalism’ 
nor ‘secularist republican monoculturalism’ has worked.186 There is, 
of course, also a security dimension to these debates, which will be 
explored in Chapter 6.
4.4 Case study: The Jewish diaspora
The Jewish diaspora is the original diaspora. In the aftermath of the 
conquest of their lands from the 8th century BC – in particular after the 
destruction of Solomon’s Temple in 586 BC and the fall of Jerusalem 
and the Second Temple in 70 AD – the Jews were dispersed around 
the Middle East and the world. The story of diaspora Jews is told at 
Beth Hatefutsoth, the Museum of the Jewish Diaspora in Tel Aviv: 
the exiles to Babylonia and beyond; the Ashkenazim and Sephardim; 
the pogroms; the remarkable creativity of Jewish scientists, artists 
and entrepreneurs; the Holocaust; the establishment of the modern 
state of Israel in 1948; and down through to the present. There are 
disagreements on the size of the world Jewish population, but the 
demographer Sergio DellaPergola estimates it comprises 13.1 million 
people, of whom about 7.8 million live in the diaspora. According 
to DellaPergola, Israel has now overtaken the US in hosting the 
largest community of Jews in the world: Israel contains just over 5.3 
million and the US just under that fi gure. (This is quite a milestone: 
for the fi rst time since the fi rst century, ‘a plurality of world Jewry 
may be claimed to reside in the historical homeland.’) The other 2.5 
million diaspora Jews are spread across a number of countries such 
as France (490,000), Canada (370,000), the UK (300,000) and Russia 
(230,000), with sizeable communities also to be found in Argentina, 
Germany, Australia, Brazil, Ukraine and South Africa.187 Sheffer 
notes that the big changes in recent times have been the consolidation 
of Jews into a smaller number of larger communities, and the almost 
total disappearance of Jews from North African, Muslim and Arab 
countries.188
on the wearing of the headscarf, burqa and niqab have ensued across 
Europe, including in Britain, where Jack Straw asked his constituents 
to remove their veils so he could talk to them ‘face to face’.179 The term 
‘multiculturalism’ is falling out of vogue, replaced by ‘integration’.180 
Many governments are searching for ways to accelerate the integration 
of diaspora groups into their national mainstreams, such as requiring 
applicants for citizenship to pass various tests of their knowledge of 
and commitment to their new country’s values. British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown even fl oated the idea, before he moved into 10 Downing 
Street, of making them undertake community service.181 In the 2007 
French presidential election, the Gaullists promised a new ministry for 
immigration and national identity and the Socialists called for more 
frequent fl ying of the tricolore and singing of La Marseillaise.182
These ideas are being grafted on to very different national systems 
for bringing immigrants into the fold. It would be possible to draw an 
‘integration spectrum’ along which countries of immigration are ranged. 
At one end would be a country such as multiculturalist Britain, in which 
minority groups are, to a certain extent, dealt with collectively. Located 
at the other end would be republican France, which practises integration 
via assimilation, according to which newcomers are expected to become 
unambiguously French and the republic ‘must remain blind to ethnicity 
and religion’ (including by prohibiting conspicuous signs of religiosity 
in the schools).183 The US, where the politics of identity are increasingly 
infl uential but where national ceremonies and rituals such as fl ag-
raising ceremonies and the Fourth of July continue to have what Francis 
Fukuyama calls a ‘quasi-religious’ character, would appear somewhere 
in between.184 The truth is, however, that no system has fully answered 
the diffi cult questions thrown up by large-scale immigration. In too 
many Western countries, Muslims in particular do not really know 
where they belong: they feel, as some say crudely in France, d’avoir le cul 
entre deux chaises, that is, their backsides fall between two chairs. The 
multiculturalism of Britain and much of northern Europe has invested 
excessive authority in unelected community leaders and created too 
many cultural ghettoes. Equally, the militant secularism practised in 
France has ignored the religious and cultural dimensions of immigrants’ 
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Yom Kippur War but rather became politically conscious at the time 
of more recent confl icts such as the wars in Lebanon and the two 
Palestinian intifadas.192 There is a body of sociological research 
pointing to a distancing of younger American Jews from Israel; for 
example, a recent research project led by Steven Cohen of Hebrew 
Union College–Jewish Institute of Religion found that American 
Jews under the age of 35 were signifi cantly less attached to Israel 
than their elders.193 The Economist observes that ‘Young Jews today… 
are searching for identity, spirituality, meaning and roots’; some are 
fi nding new ways of ‘doing Jewish that have little to do with Israel 
or even religion’, such as studying Jewish culture and engaging in 
tikkun olam – ‘world repair’ or social activism, which can include 
campaigning against genocide or undertaking volunteer work in the 
developing world.194 The past year has seen the establishment of 
groups such as Independent Jewish Voices in the United Kingdom, 
which seeks to counter what it regards as the uncritical support given 
to Israel by the mainstream British Jewish organisations (though its 
statements have been strongly criticised by other diaspora Jews).195 
Notwithstanding these changes, Jewish affi liation with Israel is still 
remarkably close compared to other diasporas, partly because of the 
elastic relationship between Israeli security and Jewish identity. 
As Yossi Shain argues: ‘When security is threatened, debates over 
identity recede… when perceptions of acute insecurity are evident, 
they may rapidly create a sense of kinship solidarity that overwhelms 
other dimensions of identity.’196
Israel’s view of the Jewish diaspora is also changing, in at least 
three important ways. First, the country’s historic dilemma – whether 
to persuade diaspora Jews to make aliyah on the ground that only 
in Israel can they be safe and fully themselves, or to legitimise the 
diaspora’s existence by working with it – has largely been resolved 
in favour of the latter. It is becoming rare to hear talk of diaspora 
Jews living in the galut (exile), with all the associated negative 
connotations.197 The old attitude still persists in some quarters: in 
2004, for instance, the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon angered the 
French Jewish community by warning its members of ‘the wildest 
Many diaspora Jews provided succour to Zionists working 
towards the establishment of an Israeli state, and they were crucial 
to its survival through its infancy. Since the 1950s, for instance, 
interest-bearing securities known as Israeli bonds have been sold 
in the US, principally to American Jews, to fund major projects in 
Israel. ‘The Almighty placed massive oil deposits under Arab soil,’ 
an Israeli offi cial explained to a US diplomat. ‘It is our good fortune 
that God placed fi ve million Jews in America.’189 Israel has always 
been central to Jewish identity, not only because of the need for a 
haven from anti-Semitism but because Jewish theology privileges the 
concept of a homeland – Eretz Israel, the land of Israel. The Book 
of Genesis describes the covenant the Lord made with Abraham 
and his descendants, which awarded them the promised land for 
all time. The birkat hamazon, a Jewish grace said after meals, asks 
that Jerusalem be blessed, and the Passover seder (ritual feast) 
traditionally concludes with the prayer: ‘Next year in Jerusalem!’ 
Jewish immigration to Israel, aliyah (ascending or going up), is seen 
by many as a praiseworthy act, and under Israel’s Law of Return, 
any Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel and gain citizenship. 
Of course, this cultural and religious emphasis on return to Israel 
complicates the position of the Jewish diaspora, since according to 
some religious Jews, ‘living outside the land is theologically a sign of 
failing to fulfi ll God’s plan.’190
The attachment of diaspora Jews to Israel remains strong 
today, maintained by family ties to Israeli citizens and sharpened 
by a sense of Israel’s precarious position in the Middle East and 
perceived anti-Israel bias in the media. The alphabet soup of Jewish 
diaspora organisations makes for a strong brew. Threats to Israel’s 
security invariably lead to spikes in diasporic support: for example, 
an appeal by an American umbrella organisation, the United Jewish 
Communities, during Israel’s 2006 war against Hizballah in Lebanon 
raised US$340 million in six weeks.191 That said, many community 
members have observed that the nature of the attachment is 
changing, especially for new generations who did not live through 
the Holocaust, the War of Independence, the Six Day War, or the 
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4.5 Case study: The Israeli diaspora
The Jewish diaspora is unique, in that it is religious and ethnic in 
character as well as national. More analogous to other national diasporas, 
perhaps, is the lesser known diaspora consisting of Israeli citizens who 
have emigrated from Israel. Data on the Israeli diaspora is not robust, but 
it probably numbers between one-half and three-quarters of a million 
people, who live mainly in North America, Europe, Australia and South 
Africa.204 Its members include both sabras (native-born Israeli Jews) 
and Israeli immigrants who have moved on again, and they tend to be 
relatively young and well educated. Some have left Israel to escape the 
Middle East and its confl icts. Others have left for religious reasons – 
secularists who fi nd Israel too theocratic, and Orthodox who fi nd it too 
secular. However the primary motivation, as it is for most contemporary 
migrants, is a desire to improve their economic situation.205 Historically, 
members of the Israeli diaspora have tended not to involve themselves 
in local Jewish communal organisations and activities but rather have 
retained a strong Israeli identity and continued to live like Israelis. 
Rina Cohen observes that ‘Israeli and diaspora Jews speak different 
languages, read different books, sing different songs, eat different kinds 
of food, and enjoy different kinds of sports.’206 As Gallya Lahav and 
Asher Arian put it, the communities ‘exist in two different shtetls or 
villages’.207
Another historical reason for the distance between the two groups 
was the stigma attaching to Israeli émigrés. To emigrate from Israel 
is to make yeridah or ‘go down’ – the literal opposite of aliyah – and 
emigrants are sometimes known as yordim. ‘Since the basis of Zionism 
is an “ingathering of exiles”’, write Lahav and Arian, ‘the notion of a 
diaspora in the Israeli case seems antithetical to the founding principles 
of the Israeli nation-state.’208 Apart from violating Zionist principles, 
emigration could seem like desertion when Israel’s security was 
threatened: one interviewee told me that the traditional view was: ‘if 
you’re not here, you’re missing in action’. The 1970s marked the high 
point of this perspective, with public inquiries into the phenomenon 
of emigration, and the then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s infamous 
anti-Semitism here’ and suggesting they ‘move to Israel, as early as 
possible… it’s a must… Only through aliyah will Israel maintain 
its character as a Jewish state. Only in Israel is it possible to lead a 
fully Jewish existence.’198 Generally, though, pragmatism rules, and 
most Israelis now accept that many Jews will never make aliyah and 
that good Jews can fl ourish in the diaspora. A related change is that 
the traditional view that diaspora Jews should not criticise Israel as 
they don’t bear the burdens of life in the Jewish state appears to be 
softening. Israeli leaders are more likely to see Jews in chutz laaretz 
(the rest of the world) as ‘stakeholders’ and less likely to dismiss 
diaspora criticism out of hand.199
Finally, Israel is reaching out to the Jewish diaspora in new and 
interesting ways. Of course, the state has always put a premium on 
diaspora relations. Israeli prime ministers have traditionally had an 
adviser on diaspora affairs (a position that has been held by some 
prominent Israeli fi gures, such as Avrum Burg, later Speaker of the 
Knesset) and they invariably meet with the local Jewish communities 
when they travel abroad. There is a Minister for Diaspora Affairs 
as well as a World Jewish and Inter-Religious Affairs Bureau in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of which comments that the 
diaspora is Israel’s ‘most important strategic ally in the world.’200 
There have long been programs such as Nefesh B’Nefesh which seek to 
encourage aliyah.201 However more recently, Israeli institutions have 
established innovative new programs which implicitly accept that many 
diaspora Jews will not make aliyah and instead seek to entrench their 
sense of Jewish identity and attachment to Israel. In the past decade, 
for instance, Taglit (Birthright Israel), which is funded by the Jewish 
Agency for Israel, the Israeli government and several philanthropists, 
has brought 120,000 Jewish young adults to Israel for a free ten-day 
experience that some credit as being ‘transformative’. Masa brings 
young Jews to Israel for longer periods, a semester or a year.202 These 
kinds of ‘Israel experiences’ are popular with Israelis, who regard 
them as tax money well spent, and, according to sociologists, they 
have a powerful effect upon the participants’ adult Jewish identity 
and feelings of affi liation towards Israel.203
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have opened a bayit yisraeli (Israeli house) to act as a cultural centre 
for local Israeli communities and to host celebrations, lectures and 
performances.216 The Israel Defense Forces are reported to be stepping 
up their efforts to recruit Israelis living abroad.217 The attitudinal change 
is also refl ected in the country’s media. As one account has it:
Israeli tabloids used to be the brave defenders of narrow-
minded patriotism. The very idea of sabras leaving their 
wonderful native country to seek their fortunes elsewhere 
was anathema… Then, at some point during the 
hedonistic Nineties, all this changed. Suddenly, successful 
Israeli expatriates, especially hi-tech pioneers, became 
objects of admiration featured on magazine covers in 
idolizing profi les. The relevant terminology also changed, 
with yordim haphazardly giving way to “Israelis living 
overseas”, and the time-honored attitude of mixed disdain 
and pity giving way to unconcealed envy.218
The transformation of Israelis’ opinion of their émigrés may well, 
over time, change the self-perception of Israelis living abroad. In the 
past, when the idea of Israeli emigration was regarded as illegitimate, 
emigrants tended to adopt a defensive tone about their move and 
emphasise its temporary nature; however, as their position normalises, 
they are less likely to regard themselves as ‘sitting on their suitcases’.219 
Similarly, the previously cool relationship between the Jewish and 
Israeli diasporas may also warm up as Israeli thinking changes. Indeed, 
there is already some research, as well as anecdotal evidence, indicating 
that the distance between the communities is closing.220
4.6 Case study: Turks in Germany
The Turkish diaspora is entirely different from its Israeli counterpart 
in origins and character, yet it is exhibiting some similar trends. 
According to the Turkish government, there are approximately fi ve 
million Turks abroad, of whom about four million live in Europe, with 
1976 description of emigrants as ‘nefolet shel nemushot’ (‘the fallen 
among the weaklings’).209 Since that time, however, the tide has washed 
out, and the negative associations have all but disappeared.
Some of the reasons for the change are peculiar to the Israeli situation: 
the country seemed more secure in the 1990s, which lessened the stigma 
of leaving it; and pragmatists within the government realised that 
yordim and their children were attractive immigration targets, being 
familiar with Israeli ways and therefore easier to absorb into Israel 
than other olim (Jewish immigrants).210 But the principal cause is the 
same as that transforming many homeland-diaspora relationships: the 
growth of international labour mobility. Most yordim are not Persian 
rug-cleaners, peddlers, furniture-movers or any of the other clichés. 
Rather, they are the benefi ciaries of globalisation: Israeli-born software 
engineers in Silicon Valley, for example, or Russian immigrants who 
have returned to Russia but still invest in Israel and act as economic 
middle men. There is a growing number of ‘transnationals’, who have 
a foothold in more than one country.211 Like members of other national 
diasporas, ‘[m]any of them navigate between two worlds: they are 
pulled towards Israel for various reasons; they visit the country often 
and they send their children to summer camps in Israel and later, to 
serve in its army; and every year, thousands of yordim return.’212 ‘In the 
old days, aliyah was one way’, says Moshe Vigdor, Director General of 
the Jewish Agency. ‘Now people retain their citizenship but move back 
and forth between countries.’ An Israeli diplomat puts it more simply: 
‘Israel has grown up.’213
Politicians now read from the new script, beginning with Rabin 
himself, who recanted his earlier view in 1991, saying ‘The Israelis living 
abroad are an integral part of the Jewish community and there is no 
point talking about ostracism.’214 The Ministry of Immigrant Absorption 
has initiated a system of incentives and programs to encourage citizens 
to return, from discounts on El Al Airlines to job placement assistance, 
and it provides advice via special ‘open telephone lines’.215 However, the 
effort is not all about encouraging return: existing programs such as the 
Tzofi m (Israeli scouts), Taglit and Masa are open to overseas Israelis 
as well as diaspora Jews. A number of Israeli diplomatic missions 
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coups d’état) made the idea of return less attractive, they brought their 
families over, moved into their own residences and had German-born 
children. The shrinking cost of transport and communications also 
made it easier for them to stay because they did not have to cut off their 
links to home – they could return annually or even spend six months of 
every year in their home village.227 All this has forced Berlin to accept 
the reality of Turkish immigration and permanent settlement. In 2000 
the German government introduced a new nationality law that moved 
from the principle of jus sanguinis (the ‘right of blood’, which privileges 
genealogy in conferring citizenship) to a modifi ed version of jus soli 
(the ‘right of soil’, according to which citizenship is granted to all those 
born within the borders of the state).228 The most important effect of 
this reform was to open up German citizenship to many more Turks; 
previously, as Fukuyama observes: ‘A second or third generation Turk 
who spoke only German had a harder time achieving naturalization 
than a recent ethnic German refugee from Russia who spoke not a word 
of German.’229 All these developments are spurring the integration of 
many Turks into German society.230 For some, though, the reverse is the 
case: the decision to stay is liberating them to be more assertive about 
their language, religion and traditions. If you are more confi dent about 
your position, you are also likely to be more confi dent about drawing 
attention to yourself.231 In the phrase of Turkish academic Ayhan Kaya, 
it has become ‘easier for German-Turks to live on “both banks of the 
river” at the same time.’232
The mindset of the Turkish government and Turkish people has also 
shifted. Turkish émigrés were never condemned as traitors but they 
were patronised by Turkey’s urban elite as second-class citizens: they 
were Almanci (Turks who have adopted German ways), wealthy but 
unsophisticated. However a reasonably dynamic Turkish middle class 
is emerging in Germany, the members of which are not döviz makinesi 
(‘remittance machines’) but ‘Euro Turks’.233 Turks are becoming aware 
– even proud – of the success some of their cousins are achieving in 
Germany, in football, the arts and business. The tourism entrepreneur 
Vural Öger, who started out selling package tours home for guestworkers 
and went on to found the budget airline AtlasJet, and now represents the 
sizeable communities in France (360,000), the Netherlands (350,000), 
Austria (200,000), Belgium (160,000) and the UK (115,000). By far the 
largest community, though, is found in Germany, where there are over 
2.5 million Turks – more than half the entire diaspora.221 In fact, the 
Turkey-Germany corridor is the third most travelled migration corridor 
in the world.222 Unlike most Muslim populations in Europe, such as 
the Pakistanis in Britain or the Maghrebis in France, the Turks came 
to Germany not as former colonial subjects but as economic migrants. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, German companies recruited nearly 
one million temporary Turkish workers, often poorly educated people 
from rural Anatolia; after the program was halted, the community 
continued to expand via family reunifi cation and spousal migration as 
well as the birth rate.223 Over the course of nearly half a century, this 
population has brought colour and diversity to German society and 
transformed areas like the Kreuzberg borough of Berlin: but it has also 
infl uenced Turkey’s identity. According to academic Hakan Yilmaz: ‘The 
borders are becoming permeable. When German-Turks come home to 
visit family, they bring a certain European attitude to life, sometimes 
to the remotest villages. You will fi nd German-style townhouses in the 
Black Sea region of Anatolia. The best and cleanest toilets in Turkish 
gas stations are operated by German-Turks who have re-immigrated. 
They bring discipline and attentiveness to time back to Turkey.’224 (A 
similar phenomenon occurs with respect to British-Turks: one can fi nd 
English Victorian terrace houses in central Anatolian villages such as 
Sivas.225 In the same manner, there are faux-Italianate villas in villages 
in the Philippines which have sent maids to Italy.226)
The most important recent change has been the realisation on the 
part of both the Turks themselves as well as the German government 
that the community is in Germany for good. Initially, the immigrants 
assumed their stay would be temporary: they lived in dormitories, 
remitted most of their incomes back to Turkey, and continued to 
speak in their mother tongue. Equally, the German government, 
which regarded them as Gastarbeiter (guestworkers) and Ausländer 
(foreigners), made little effort to integrate them into German society. 
However, over time, as conditions in Turkey (including recessions and 
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participating in government-sponsored dialogues; on the other hand, 
it is an outpost of the Turkish state. Both Turkish and German are 
spoken at its events. Visitors to DİTİB’s headquarters in Cologne are 
struck by the many portraits of the founder of the Turkish republic, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, displayed on its walls – sometimes scowling, 
sometimes peering bravely into the middle distance, in one photo looking 
like a 1930s matinee idol in white tie and tails. The main foyer of the 
building features portraits of the German and Turkish presidents and 
both national fl ags – but sitting a few inches above them all on the wall 
is Atatürk’s image. Furthermore, DİTİB’s leaders are not local German-
Turks elected by their community, but Turkish government offi cials 
paid by Ankara. The current president of DİTİB, Sadi Arslan, wears a 
second hat as religious counsellor at Turkey’s embassy in Berlin; he has 
previously served on similar postings in Sweden and at the Vatican.238
This contradiction has presented both DİTİB and the German 
government with problems from time to time. The International Crisis 
Group argues, for instance, that Germany has ‘outsourced management 
of Islam, relying on what is essentially an extension of the Turkish 
state… to tend to religious needs.’ The President of the Diyanet, Ali 
Bardakoğlu, admits that ‘sometimes foreign governments misperceive 
Diyanet’s activities as interference in their sovereign activities.’239 
However the arrangement suits the interests of both Berlin and 
Ankara, propagating a liberal interpretation of Islam which appeals 
to the German authorities, and helping to keep in check Islamist and 
other minority elements which could threaten the Kemalist tradition 
in Turkey. Liberal critics in Germany have been noticeably less 
voluble since 9/11.240 Closer integration of Turks into German society 
in the future may make the arrangement – originally designed for a 
population of resident aliens – look archaic. At this stage, however, the 
biggest challenge to DİTİB’s position comes from the growth of other 
Islamic organisations such as Milli Görüş which, although unconnected 
to the Turkish government, are often affi liated with other Turkish 
institutions, including opposition political parties.241 The diasporic 
link shows no sign of weakening in this case, in other words, but the 
unmanageability of diasporas may show up in the future.
German Social Democrats in the European Parliament, is a poster boy 
for this new class – and Ankara is reaching out to them. Eva Østergaard-
Nielsen argues that the ‘largely economic project of labour rotation has 
now been replaced by a political project to tie citizens abroad to the State’. 
Ankara no longer refers to the Turkish diaspora as ‘our workers abroad’ 
but ‘our citizens abroad’; it is stepping in to provide them with Turkish 
language instruction; it is convening meetings of Turkish-origin members 
of foreign parliaments and inviting Turkish citizens living abroad home 
for consultations. According to Østergaard-Nielsen, ‘Turkey wants its 
citizens abroad not to assimilate into their receiving countries, but to 
settle as Turks.’234 The current AKP-led government is more partial than 
its predecessors to the idea of Turkish emigrants integrating into their 
host countries, learning the local language and acquiring citizenship – 
but it, too, wants them to retain their ties to Turkey.
In some ways the precursor to this approach was religion. In Turkey, 
the highest Islamic authority is the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate 
of Religious Affairs), a government institution which appoints Imams, 
organises religious affairs and provides ‘sound religious information’ to 
believers.235 The Diyanet’s ideology, according to Katherine Pratt Ewing, 
stresses a ‘unitary Turkish identity expressed in Islamic language’, plays 
down differences between Muslim sects in Turkey and emphasises that 
‘Islam is a religion of harmony and peace.’ In 1971, responding to demand 
from Turkish emigrants but also to prevent Islamists from mobilising 
amongst them, the Diyanet began providing religious services to Turks 
abroad.236 The Diyanet trains and sends Turkish Imams (or ‘religious 
offi cials’, as Turkish civil servants are wont to call them) on four-year 
overseas postings to serve Turkish expatriate communities overseas; 
currently it has about seven hundred Imams in Germany, covering an 
estimated 70% of German mosques. The Diyanet’s German proxy, 
Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği (Turkish Islamic Union for Religious 
Affairs) or DİTİB, facilitates pilgrimage to Mecca and burial in Turkey, 
and raises funds from community members for the construction of new 
mosques.237
DİTİB is a strange creature: on the one hand, it represents the interests 
of German-Turks, providing comment to the media, for instance, and 
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Chapter 5
Nations as large as the world:
Diasporas and politics
The impact of émigrés on the politics of both their homelands and 
their host countries is an old story; in fact it was already an old story 
in the eighteenth century when the Jacobite pretender Bonnie Prince 
Charlie plotted his return to the throne from various redoubts on the 
Continent. However, these relationships are increasingly operating in 
new and different ways. Furthermore, other developments are taking 
place: diasporas are becoming instruments of soft power; sending 
countries are reaching out politically to their emigrants; and there is an 
increasingly prominent debate about diasporas and democracy, which 
is illustrated in the intriguing case of the Italian electoral system.
5.1 Diasporans and their host countries
Analysis of the infl uence of diasporas on the politics and foreign 
policies of their host countries typically centres on the US, for a couple 
of reasons. The fi rst is that US foreign policy matters: even after its Iraq 
folly, the country has extraordinary reach. America is the only country 
with a truly global foreign policy. Every day, most foreign ministers in 
The triangular relationships between diasporas, homelands and host 
countries are highly variable, but a pattern can be detected. In many 
cases, it seems that diasporas and homelands are moving towards each 
other, while host countries are growing concerned by the existence of 
foreign diasporas within their jurisdictions. National identity, always 
elastic, is becoming even more complicated. (The differences between the 
Jewish and Israeli diasporas, which are little understood outside Israel, 
are indicative of the complexity of the issue.) The stigma associated 
with emigration in countries such as Israel, Turkey and Australia 
is declining and in its place we are seeing a realistic acceptance that 
increasing numbers of individuals are leading transnational lives. On 
the other hand, many states are still tempted to assert the prerogatives 
of sovereignty over their far-fl ung people.
Identity matters, not least because it shapes behaviour. The next two 
chapters examine the relationship between diasporas and political and 
security behaviour.
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able to afford to play the Washington infl uence game. Whether a lobby 
prevails or not depends on the characteristics of the lobby itself as well 
as the circumstances in which it operates – in particular, public opinion, 
the merits of its case and the positioning of other powerful interests on 
the issue.247 For every critic decrying the splintering effect ethnic lobbies 
have on US policy, there is another who sees them as ‘part of American 
pluralism or as counterweights to traditional political elites.’248
With those caveats in mind, it does seem that the pace of diasporic 
effects on US foreign policy has quickened since the end of the Cold 
War. The Soviet collapse led to two mutually reinforcing phenomena in 
the 1990s: the rise of identity politics and the liberation of US foreign 
policy from its Cold War straitjacket. Huntington argues that ‘during the 
Cold War… the interests of refugee diasporas from communist countries 
broadly corresponded with the goals of American foreign policy. 
Eastern European diasporas promoted the liberation of their countries 
from Soviet rule; Russian, Chinese, and Cuban diasporas supported 
US efforts to weaken or end communist control of their homelands.’249 
The Cold War’s end, however, complicated matters: in many cases 
ideological opposition to homeland governments gave way to renewed 
identifi cation with and support for the homeland; in other cases, such 
as the Cuban and Iraqi communities, it further poisoned feelings 
towards the regime at home. In the 1990s, Huntington complained of 
diasporas infl uencing American policy ‘towards Greece and Turkey, the 
Caucasus, the recognition of Macedonia, support for Croatia, sanctions 
against South Africa, aid for black Africa, intervention in Haiti, NATO 
expansion, sanctions against Cuba, the controversy in Northern Ireland, 
and the relations between Israel and its neighbours.’250 A decade later, 
he wrote of political ‘proxy wars’ fought between diasporas in America: 
Armenian groups helping defeat pro-Turkish congressmen; a senatorial 
election which was ‘as much a contest between Indians and Pakistanis 
as between Republicans and Democrats.’251
The argument is easily overstated: for instance, Shain reminds us 
that American support for diasporic opposition to Communist regimes 
waxed and waned with changing American strategic interests.252 (Many 
Croats believe, for example, that Washington declined to support anti-
the world wonder at least once: ‘What does Washington think about 
this?’ The second reason is that US politics is unusually receptive to 
ethnic infl uences, due to the heterogeneity of the American population 
and the design of American institutions. In particular, the strength 
of the congressional voice on US foreign policy amplifi es the role of 
lobbies, including ethnic lobbies.242
Diasporas have long infl uenced US foreign policy – both in promoting 
the interests of their homelands (such as the Irish, Greek, German and 
Jewish communities) and stirring up opposition to the ruling regime at 
home (such as Cuban-Americans). In the 1950s, the power of ethnic 
lobbies was thought to be declining along with assimilation, but in the 
1970s and 1980s, ethnic identity made a comeback – to the point where 
Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan were not shouted down when 
they overstated their case in 1975 in this way: ‘the immigration process 
is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy.’243 
Former Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger has claimed the US has ‘less of a foreign policy in a traditional 
sense of a great power than we have the stapling together of a series of 
goals put forth by domestic constituency groups’.244 The truth is less 
dramatic than these formulations: as Alexander DeConde argued in an 
infl uential book, highly motivated and organised ethnic groups have 
sometimes exercised signifi cant infl uence, but they have not altered the 
fundamental direction of American foreign policy. Ethnoracial concerns 
are ‘a prominent determinant of American foreign policy’, but they are 
not ‘the engine of history.’245 Two examples indicate the position: on 
the one hand, Washington’s support for the recreation of Poland after 
the First World War was linked to the Polish-American vote; on the 
other, the development of the special relationship with the UK was not 
impeded by the Anglophobia of Irish- and German-Americans.246
James Lindsay notes that the US is actually host ‘to remarkably few 
ethnic foreign lobbies. One looks in vain, for example, for Dutch, French, 
Canadian, Italian, or Norwegian lobbies’. He suggests that ethnic groups 
tend to weigh in on foreign policy only when certain factors are present: 
for instance, they came to the US as political exiles; their homelands are 
threatened by their neighbours; and they are suffi ciently successful to be 
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world to characterise those massacres as genocide, even though any 
such recognition gravely offends the Turkish authorities. Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s description of the killings as genocide 
in 2006, for example, led Ankara to withdraw the Turkish component 
from NATO manoeuvres in Canada.257 After a nasty public debate in 
the same year featuring duelling full-page advertisements in Libération, 
France’s National Assembly voted to criminalise the denial of the 
Armenian genocide, which caused the Turks to suspend military ties 
with France and blacklist French arms dealers.258
An even bigger contretemps occurred in October 2007 when the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives voted 
in favour of applying the genocide label, notwithstanding Turkey’s 
strategic importance as, in the words of an anxious President Bush, ‘a 
key ally in NATO and in the global war on terror.’259 As the Speaker of 
the House, Nancy Pelosi (who hails from California, a state containing a 
large and formidably well-organised Armenian-American community), 
prepared to put the bill before the full House, the stakes became 
clear. Turkey recalled its ambassador to Washington and American 
commanders voiced fears that Ankara might reduce logistical support 
to US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example by denying the US 
access to the Incirlik air base. The vote also threatened to undercut 
Washington’s ability to restrain Turkey from launching cross-border 
incursions against Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq, who had 
repeatedly attacked Turkish forces.260 However, in late October, the 
proponents of the resolution and the Democratic leadership stepped 
back from the brink, postponing a vote on the resolution until 2008. 
It appeared that they had taken President Bush’s point: ‘With all [its] 
pressing responsibilities, one thing Congress should not be doing is 
sorting out the historical record of the Ottoman Empire.’261
The Armenian example is a good illustration of the extent of diasporic 
power over host country politics – and its limits. The fl uidity of the 
post-Cold War environment allowed the Armenian community to put 
their demand before the nation’s very highest legislative authorities, 
impeding the executive’s national security strategy and diminishing 
Washington’s infl uence on a close ally. However, in the end, core US 
Communist Croatian networks because it was concerned not to push 
the Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito back into the Soviet orbit.) However, 
the Cold War’s end does seem to have widened the political space in 
which diasporas can operate, as we can see in the examples of the Iraq 
war and the Armenian genocide debate.
The environment in which the Bush Administration decided to 
invade Iraq in 2003 was uniquely permissive. As Gideon Rose argues, 
victory in the Cold War had strengthened America’s international 
position to such an extent that there were few external checks on 
its behaviour; 9/11 gave the White House comparable freedom of 
action on the domestic front.253 Heightened threat perception on the 
part of Americans drove US action, but low threat reality enabled 
it.254 In deciding to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad by 
force, President Bush and his advisers ignored Machiavelli’s warning 
to princes against listening to exiles, and consulted sympathetic 
Iraqi émigrés such as Kanan Makiya and Ahmed Chalabi. The Iraqi 
diaspora did not conjure the American invasion of their country into 
being; however, certain diasporans certainly contributed to the Bush 
Administration’s overoptimism about the reception Coalition troops 
would receive, and provided moral cover for US actions.255 (Not that 
this lesson has necessarily been learnt by all the responsible parties. 
In 2007, former Administration hawk John Bolton said: ‘There are all 
kinds of ways to change the [Iranian] regime. We have an extensive 
diaspora of people with Iranian heritage in America who we don’t use 
effectively.’256)
In the case of the Iraq war, then, some elements of the Iraqi diaspora 
helped to reinforce a decision of the Bush Administration that was 
born of American primacy. But the end of the Cold War has also 
complicated matters for the executive, because the falling away of Cold 
War simplicities has made more areas of American policy contestable, 
opening up cracks in which ethnic lobbies can exert their leverage. The 
Armenian diaspora is a case in point. The mass killings of Armenians 
by the Ottomans from 1915 was the most important event in modern 
Armenian history and it is an adhesive that binds the diaspora together. 
Its members are highly effective in lobbying politicians around the 
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5.2 Diasporans and their homelands
The political infl uence of diaporas has often been felt in host countries. 
But as The Economist observed a few years ago, ‘now something new is 
taking place: diasporas are increasingly exerting infl uence on the politics of 
the countries they have physically, but not emotionally, abandoned.’266 In 
the time of cheap international travel and instantaneous communications, 
it is much easier to have a meaningful and dynamic relationship with 
a homeland thousands of miles away. There was a notable example of 
overseas Greeks attempting to pressure a reluctant Athens to carve a 
giant effi gy of Alexander the Great on a cliff face on Mount Kerdyllion 
– to the considerable disquiet of the Macedonians.267 Slovak nationalists 
in the US and Canada are said to have encouraged Slovak separatism 
in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution.268 Elements of the Turkish 
diaspora in Germany and other European countries, such as the Alevis (a 
heterodox Shia denomination of Islam) have been active in urging their 
brethren back in Turkey to vote in national elections. Some members of 
the Lebanese diaspora living at the other end of the earth are political 
powerbrokers back in their home towns in Lebanon.269
Finally, diasporans are returning to their homelands to enter politics 
in greater numbers than ever. There is a rich tradition of exiles, from 
Guiseppe Garibaldi through to Ho Chi Minh, Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Benazir Bhutto, going back to their home countries after periods 
abroad. The decades M. K. Gandhi spent in South Africa were 
critical to his political formation and his later victories in the fi ght for 
Indian independence. In South Africa he experienced discrimination, 
developed his concept of satyagraha (non-violent resistance) and 
learned to transcend the religious, linguistic, regional, caste and class 
backgrounds of Indians to create a national movement. The historian 
Sugata Bose says Gandhi ‘returned after two decades with his conception 
of Indian nationality deeply infl uenced by his overseas experience… 
[he] extended his regional homeland abroad and connected it back to a 
larger, extraterritorial conception of India.’270
The tradition continues today; indeed, it extends to different 
countries and types of people. As diasporans’ ties to home thicken 
interests – in particular the welfare of American forces – interrupted 
the diaspora’s momentum.
It is hard to measure accurately the temperature of diasporic political 
activity, but it does seem that it may be heating up. There is no question 
at all, however, that the phenomenon is attracting more scrutiny than 
ever before. In the post-Second World War period, the loyalty of ethnic 
lobbies has periodically been called into question, for example after 
Greek-Americans helped persuade Congress to sanction Turkey after 
its 1974 invasion of Cyprus.262 However a much harsher light was 
shone on the topic in 2006-2007 following the publication by political 
scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt of a working paper, an 
article in the London Review of Books and fi nally a book on the infl uence 
of ‘the Israel Lobby’ on US foreign policy.263 Mearsheimer and Walt 
argued that ‘the Lobby’, which is dominated by elements of the Jewish 
diaspora but also includes evangelical Christians, neoconservatives and 
others, has bent US foreign policy to benefi t Israel at the expense of 
American interests, and bears a heavy responsibility for the Iraq war. A 
charged debate ensued, which included claims of anti-Semitism being 
levelled at the authors.
In retrospect, pro-Israel activists were probably fortunate in their 
choice of opponents: Mearsheimer and Walt are distinguished scholars, 
but their argument was reductive and one-sided.264 One reviewer 
observed that its Judeocentric tone was accentuated by the ominous 
capitalisation, in the style of a Robert Ludlum novel, of ‘the Lobby’.265 
The debate unnerved some in the American Jewish community, yet it 
seems unlikely that the fracas will have much long-term impact on that 
community’s political effectiveness. An interesting question, though, 
is whether other ethnic lobbies will now come under fi ercer scrutiny. 
Pandora’s box has been opened and it is hard to say what will emerge. 
We may well see more collisions between energetic ethnic lobbies, 
invigorated by rising diaspora consciousness, and watchful (or even 
resentful) elements in the broader community.
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than eighty thousand people born in India obtained legal permanent 
residence in the US, making India a larger immigration source than 
China, the Philippines and Vietnam and second only to Mexico.274 In 
Washington, Indian-Americans are seen as a newly muscular political 
lobby, one that helped elect Congressman Bobby Jindal as the fi rst non-
white governor of Louisiana in more than a century, and helped secure 
congressional approval for the 2006 US-India deal, which promises to 
allow New Delhi to buy fuel, reactors and other technology to expand 
its civilian nuclear program.275 Of course, success leads to visibility, 
not all of it welcome. In 2007, Barack Obama’s presidential campaign 
implied that his rival for the Democratic nomination was an Indian fi fth 
columnist, referring in a leaked opposition research memorandum to 
‘Hillary Clinton (D–Punjab)’.276 One of the reasons for the community’s 
new infl uence is organisational: Indian-Americans are self-consciously 
modelling their activism on that of Jewish Americans and using the 
Jewish community’s lobbying efforts, in the words of the Chairman of 
the US India Political Action Committee, as ‘a benchmark.’277 (In fact, 
there are many commonalities between the two communities, including 
the premium they both put on education, the recent improved relations 
between Israel and India, and the fact that both countries are threatened 
by Islamic extremism.) The other reason is structural. India’s post-Cold 
War emergence as a newly assertive Asian nuclear power and a potential 
counterweight to China means that Indian-Americans making pro-
Indian arguments to US policymakers are pushing on an open door.
Indian-Americans are also leaving their mark on Indian politics, 
albeit in a more subtle way. The US Census Bureau reports that Indians 
are perhaps the most successful immigrant community in the US: 
highly educated, highly paid, and overwhelmingly white-collar.278 The 
senior Indian diplomat Dr S. Jaishankar observes that the extraordinary 
success of these individuals has played a role in catalysing domestic 
economic reform, by raising the standards and aspirations of Indians 
in India.279 Furthermore, Indian-Americans appear to be affecting 
Indians’ view of America. At a time when anti-Americanism is rising in 
most parts of the world, Indians are notably pro-American. According 
to the Pew Research Center’s 2007 data, only a few large national 
and the countries of the former Soviet Union democratise, emigrants 
are being pulled into the politics of their homelands. The Economist 
reports that Turkey’s governing AKP party ‘has parachuted diaspora 
leaders into safe electoral seats in Turkey to reward them for fund-
raising abroad. Afghanistan has pondered putting its ex-king back on 
the throne. Bulgaria has turned its ex-monarch into a prime minister. 
The Balts have been émigré importers on an almost industrial scale. 
Since becoming independent in 1991, Estonia has recruited from the 
diaspora two foreign ministers and a defence minister, plus lots of civil 
servants, especially in the foreign ministry. Latvia’s popular president 
was brought back from Canada. It has also had the services of an 
American-Latvian defence minister, a bunch of members of parliament 
and a handful of diplomats, all mustered from the ranks of its émigrés. 
Lithuania’s huge diaspora has supplied it with a president [and] the 
current chief of general staff (both Lithuanian-Americans)’.271
Returnees can meet with resentment, of course, as South Africa’s 
Thabo Mbeki has found; some fi nd that their physical absence from the 
country has deprived them of networks that long-distance connections 
cannot replace. However the phenomenon is unlikely to abate, and 
it may have important consequences. The journalist Mary Dejevsky 
observes that soldiers returning from the American Revolutionary 
War are cited as one of the factors precipitating the French Revolution; 
disillusioned Russian veterans of the war in Afghanistan undermined 
the Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping honed their thinking 
in Paris.272 What, then, will be the long-term political repercussions for, 
say, China of having so many of its future élite educated in the West?
5.3 Case study: Indians in the United States
One group whose political reach encompasses both its host country and 
its home country is the community of Indians who have crossed the 
kalapani (dark waters) and found their way to America. The Indian 
diaspora in the US is large – about 2.5 million, according to the US 
Census Bureau273 – and growing quickly. In the past fi ve years India 
has overtaken China as a source of immigrants to the US: in 2005 more 
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populations hold more favourable views of the US than Indians, who 
are more pro-American than, for instance, South Koreans, Canadians, 
Italians, Britons and Germans.280 If India is edging strategically closer 
to the US, that shift is being enabled by America’s popularity among 
Indians. A partial explanation for that popularity must be the fact that 
most large villages in India have someone based in the US, making a go 
of things, and spreading – via letters, emails and visits home – a positive 
image of America as open, meritocratic and wealthy.281 This is even 
more the case, of course, amongst the Indian élite: Dr Sanjaya Baru, the 
spokesman of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, says he does not have 
a single friend or relative who does not have a relative in the US.282
5.4 Diasporas and soft power
Joseph Nye has written of the salience of ‘soft power’ in international 
relations: ‘A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics 
because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, 
aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it.’283 In 
these terms, Indian emigrants to the US are augmenting America’s soft 
power on the subcontinent. More often, though, diasporas will infl uence 
host countries’ view of their home country – and (as Washington is fi nding 
to its detriment) perceptions are not peripheral to national foreign policy. 
Senator Franco Danieli, Italy’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, who 
has special responsibility for Italians abroad, says that Rome wants to 
promote the Italian approach to life internationally – not only to increase 
Italian exports but also so that foreigners want to imitate Italy.284 An 
Israeli offi cial told me that when dealing with states such as China, Israel 
sometimes plays on ‘the myth of the huge Jewish superpower’, able to 
call on highly-placed supporters all over the world. Australians abroad 
are certainly instruments of Australia’s soft power. Because of the nature 
of its membership, the Australian diaspora helps to project a positive and 
contemporary national image: according to The Times, ‘Aussies are seen 
as competent, confi dent, smart, cultivated and literate.’285
However, diasporans can also reduce a country’s soft power. There is 
an ongoing debate about how Muslim immigration to Europe is shaping 
European views on those immigrants’ homelands, as well as on broader 
issues such as the Middle East peace process and Islam in general. Some 
Israeli commentators believe that Europeans’ concerns about their own 
Muslim populations are making them more sympathetic to Israel.286 Some 
so-called ‘white Turks’, or members of Turkey’s secular elite, feel that 
the Turkish communities in Western Europe are more representative 
of traditional rural life in Anatolian villages than they are of modern 
Turkey. Interviewees are quick to point out the differences between 
the lifestyles of people residing in Istanbul compared to those residing 
in Cologne.287 The President of the Diyanet, Ali Bardakoğlu, observes: 
‘Turkish society renews itself on a regular basis, but Turks overseas 
are frozen in time. Europeans get to know about Turkish society and 
Islam via these communities, which are not representative of Turkey.’288 
Some Turks worry that Europeans’ interactions with members of the 
Turkish diaspora may even be driving down public support for Turkish 
accession to the European Union, although it is diffi cult to prove the 
correlation.289 Certainly, it is true that emigrant culture can calcify, 
failing to develop along with life in the homeland; this phenomenon 
may well sour some Europeans’ perceptions of Turkey. On the other 
hand, given the cultural contribution made by Turkish immigrants to 
their host countries, their successes in business and professional sports, 
and their lack of propensity for religious or political violence, we should 
be careful about concluding that their net effect is negative.
This example raises the broader issue of so-called ‘frozen culture’, 
the tendency for groups to maintain their culture of origin as it was 
at the time of emigration.290 An important question for the future is 
whether such frozen cultures will be thawed by the new technologies 
that allow emigrants to stay up-to-date with developments at home. 
Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins have argued, for instance, that satellite 
TV ‘brings the ordinary, banal reality of Turkish life to the migrants 
living in London… The “here and now” reality of Turkish media 
culture disturbs the imagination of a “there and then” Turkey – thereby 
working against the romance of diaspora-as-exile, against the tendency 
to false idealisation of the “homeland”.’291 On the other hand, there are 
powerful countervailing forces at play, most importantly the human 
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propensity for nostalgia. This particular dynamic will have important 
implications – for emigrants’ identities, their soft power, and their 
relationship with their homelands.292
5.5 Homelands and their diasporas
Homelands are not unaware of the growing coherence of diasporas. In 
fact, all over the world governments are struggling with the question 
of how they can use their national diasporas, in the process creating 
ministers and ministries, departments, high-level committees and 
commissions. Jagdish Bhagwati refers to a ‘diaspora’ model of state 
behaviour, ‘which integrates past and present citizens into a web of 
rights and obligations in the extended community defi ned with the home 
country as the center.’293 Alan Gamlen surveyed the diaspora engagement 
policies of seventy countries and found that for many – both rich and 
poor, on the geographical periphery and closer to the centre – reaching 
out to emigrants is becoming the norm. He identifi ed three types of 
activities: the development of a state-centric diaspora that shares a sense 
of common belonging and the creation of state institutions dedicated to 
the diaspora; the extension of political and social rights to the diaspora, so 
as to play the role of legitimate sovereign; and the extraction of obligations 
(whether fi nancial or political) from the diaspora on the premise that 
emigrants owe their loyalty to their sovereign.294 We can see examples 
of these approaches everywhere, for instance in government economic 
incentives aimed at Malaysians abroad;295 in forums held in London and 
Atlanta on the Kenyan diaspora’s role in directing investment to the 
homeland;296 in the revamping of Ethiopian embassies’ diaspora outreach 
efforts;297 in the issuing by Mexican consulates of matricula consular 
(registration cards) certifying that the bearer is a resident of the US;298 
and in the creation of state institutions to deal with diasporas, sometimes 
specifi c ministries but more often units within foreign ministries, such as 
the Italy’s Directorate General for Italians Abroad and Migration Policies, 
presided over by Senator Danieli.299
Morocco and China provide two different but equally instructive 
examples of emigrant engagement. As Hein de Haas relates in a new 
study,300 Morocco has seen signifi cant emigration since independence 
in 1956 – to the former colonial power, France, but also to Spain, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Germany, the Middle East and North 
America – and its diaspora now comprises about 2.5-3.5 million people. 
For the fi rst three decades, Morocco addressed these emigrants (who 
were mainly guestworkers) as its subjects, actively discouraged their 
integration into host societies, and maintained a network of control 
across Northwest Europe consisting of diplomatic missions, mosques 
and government-controlled migrant associations (or Amicales). 
However since the early 1990s, and partly due to a worrying drop 
in remittances, the government in Rabat has moved ‘from a focus on 
controlling to what appears to be an active courting of the Moroccan 
diaspora’. The security network has been partially dismantled and 
offi cial attitudes towards integration have been relaxed. Emigrants are 
now offi cially designated Marocains Résidant à l’Étranger (Moroccan 
residents abroad) rather than Travailleurs Marocains à l’Étranger 
(Moroccan workers abroad) and the community is spoken of as a 
‘diaspora’. The Moroccan media, and even the King himself, trumpet 
emigrants’ achievements. A foundation has been established, fi nanced 
out of remittance revenues, to strengthen diasporic links, in particular 
through the annual Opération Transit, which facilitates Moroccans’ trips 
home for summer. The government is less concerned about Moroccans 
engaging in political participation abroad, perhaps because it sees that 
such activities can sometimes further the regime’s interests. This was 
the case with a number of international protests in 2005 by Moroccans 
calling for the release of their fellow nationals detained in Algeria by 
Polisario, the rebel movement fi ghting to separate the Western Sahara 
from Morocco. De Haas gives Rabat high marks for its new diaspora 
policies, which have contributed (along with more general reforms 
to Moroccan society) to spectacular growth in remittance fl ows and 
holiday visits. 
(Morocco’s new strategy is not without its problems from the 
European perspective. In 2006, for instance, the loyalties of Khadija 
Arib, a Dutch-Moroccan Labour member of the Dutch parliament, were 
questioned by her fellow MPs because of her membership of a migration 
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working group of the Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme, a council 
advising the King of Morocco on human rights issues.301 It was claimed 
that belonging to such a group was incompatible with her membership 
of the Dutch parliament.)
Beijing’s attitude to its emigrants has been cyclical. Pál Nyíri relates 
that the Song and Yuan dynasties banned emigration, viewing it as 
disloyalty to ancestors and ancestral land; the Ming dynasty relaxed 
the restrictions; the Qing renewed the ban and even cleared the coastal 
strip of its population; but in the last two decades of the Qing dynasty 
(including the early years of the twentieth century), offi cials reversed 
course and sought to put overseas Chinese to use in modernising the 
Middle Kingdom. Beijing’s assertion of its right to make political and 
fi nancial claims on its emigrants encouraged a view in host countries 
that Chinese were potentially disloyal. Sun Yat-sen’s Republic of China 
brought overseas Chinese into the national mainstream by issuing them 
with passports and awarding them voting rights; for the fi rst thirty 
years of its existence the People’s Republic tried to extend courtesies to 
overseas Chinese investors while remaining cognisant of the concerns 
of the Southeast Asian nations where many of them lived.302
However, since Mao Zedong’s death and the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s 
reforms – and especially since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre – 
Beijing has ramped up its outreach efforts, for instance by sponsoring 
various programs to enable young people to visit the homes of their 
ancestors, assisting with the development of hometown associations, 
and encouraging overseas Chinese organisations to support the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) position on issues such as the status of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Chinese offi cials certainly provided guidance to 
(which is not the same as exercising control over) overseas Chinese 
during the worldwide protests against the NATO bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and in the run-up to elections in Taiwan 
in 2000.303 Joshua Kurlantzik argues that in the past ten years ‘diaspora 
Chinese have become vital to Beijing’s global charm offensive’, as the 
PRC cultivates ethnic Chinese tycoons, supports new Chinese history 
textbooks for diaspora schools, and treats with diaspora groups as part 
of its proxy war for legitimacy against Taiwan.304 Xiang Biao observes 
that Beijing has put particular emphasis recently on those who left 
China after the 1980s and were relatively well educated, seeing them as 
an aid to the internationalisation of the Chinese economy.305
During the same period, government efforts have been supported by a 
revolution in Chinese media discourse on the topic. In the 1980s, Chinese 
students overseas were unpatriotic and their host countries were ‘brain 
plunderers’; now emigration is celebrated as a patriotic and modern 
act. Historical expressions such as ‘sons and grandsons of the Yellow 
Emperor’ are being heard again. According to Nyíri, ‘media reporting 
on the overseas Chinese has been put to the service of a triumphalist, 
unifi catory and mobilizing myth of Chineseness as an eternal cultural 
condition inherited with blood’. So-called ‘new migrants’ are presented 
as folk heroes: ‘educated, clever, ambitious, unscrupulous, and poor’. 
Once the Chinese Communist Party called on overseas Chinese students 
to ‘return to serve’ (huiguo fuwu), but since the 1990s the slogan has 
been simply ‘serve the country’ (wei guo fuwu).306
The Moroccan and Chinese diaspora strategies seem impressive. In the 
main, however, the notable feature of homeland expatriate engagement 
efforts is actually the gap between ambition and capacity. In contrast to 
other aspects of diasporas, there is actually less to this topic than meets 
the eye. Quite often one hears assertions that the outreach efforts of 
some particular state are ‘best practice’ – Singapore and South Korea are 
popular examples – but on closer examination its policies turn out to 
be insubstantial. The problem, of course, is that national governments 
are not well equipped to deal with the fl uidity and international reach 
of diaspora networks. Many governments have no idea where their 
emigrants are (much less their emigrants’ descendants), let alone what 
they are doing and how they might be tapped. In his book, Who are 
we?, Samuel Huntington presents homeland governments as deliberate, 
purposeful, far-sighted actors encouraging their people to emigrate, 
directing expatriate investment into favoured projects and organising their 
diasporas so to promote homeland political interests in host societies. He 
claims that Mexico is ‘a dramatic example of the intensifi ed activity by 
foreign governments to infl uence American policy and to mobilize their 
diasporas for that purpose. Other governments making parallel efforts 
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include those of Canada, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, 
Israel, Germany, the Philippines, and China, with annual spending by 
many of them reaching into tens of millions of dollars and in a few cases 
probably exceeding a hundred million dollars.’307 In reality, outreach 
programs are often underfunded and inconsistent.308 Being both second-
order in importance and extremely diffi cult to resolve, diaspora issues 
very often fall between bureaucratic stools.
In relation to Turkey, for example, Østergaard-Nielsen cautions 
that ‘while Ankara’s changing perceptions of its citizens abroad are 
interesting… it is important not to over-state the effectiveness of the 
policies directed at these citizens.’ The factors limiting Turkey’s success 
are applicable to a number of homelands: ‘perceptions are not easily 
translated into political agency’; ‘bureaucratic practices are not easily 
coordinated or streamlined’; and ‘“Turkey” is not a unitary actor’.309 
India is another case in point. Notwithstanding all the thinking that 
has been done, New Delhi’s grandly-titled Ministry for Overseas Indian 
Affairs has fewer than fi fty employees on its books (that’s about one 
offi cial for every half-million Indians abroad).310 The Pravasi Bharatiya 
Divas (which was recently reduced in length from three to two days) is 
described by the journalist Urmi Goswami as ‘a big jamboree’, consisting 
of lots of people who are not quite sure what they’re doing there.311 
Israel’s Diaspora Affairs Ministry no longer exists: a new minister was 
recently appointed (after the position was left vacant for a year), but 
it is a part-time role and he has no civil servants reporting to him.312 
Furthermore, even if states manage to get their organisational ducks in a 
line, diasporas have their own agendas which are not always consistent 
with their homelands’ interests.313 In the Washington debate over an 
Armenian genocide resolution, for instance, the Jewish state favoured 
the position of its strategic partner Turkey, notwithstanding the fact 
that elements of the Jewish diaspora, including the Anti-Defamation 
League, have taken up the cause of the Armenian genocide.314
Given their disabilities, why do states attempt to direct their diasporas 
towards national ends? One might as well ask: Why do lions roar? Why 
do funnelweb spiders bite? States do what they do – but when it comes 
to relating to their emigrants, few do it well.
5.6 Diasporas and democracy
One of the ways that homelands assert their role as their emigrants’ 
legitimate sovereign – thereby throwing up all sorts of thorny theoretical 
and practical questions – is by involving them in the processes of 
national politics. States extend representation to their diasporas in a 
variety of different ways: one can draw a continuum of diaspora political 
representation based on the directness of the role afforded to emigrants.315 
At the ‘indirect’ pole is the convening of meetings of diasporic MPs, as 
Turkey did recently when it met with ethnic Turkish members of foreign 
parliaments.316 This kind of engagement with diaspora representatives 
has no implications for the homeland’s democratic processes. A little 
further along the continuum are consultative councils or expatriate 
parliaments (whether elected or appointed), which advise the 
government of emigrants’ views but have no legislative authority, such 
as France’s Conseil Supérieur des Français de l’Étranger (High Council 
of the French Abroad), Switzerland’s Auslandschweizer-Organisation 
(Council of the Swiss Abroad) and Finland’s Ulkosuomalaisparlamentti 
(Finnish Expatriate Parliament).317
Further still down the continuum is the provision of voting rights 
to non-residents, a phenomenon which is the subject of a new and 
exhaustive report by International IDEA. External voting is not unheard 
of in history: the Roman emperor Augustus invented a form of external 
voting for city offi ces, for example, and Wisconsin allowed soldiers 
fi ghting in the Union army in the US Civil War to lodge absentee ballots. 
In general, however, it is a twentieth century phenomenon, indeed 
some established democracies provided no external right to vote until 
the 1980s and 1990s. Since the end of the Cold War, and the attention 
to electoral rules which accompanied the democratisation of the former 
Communist bloc, there has been remarkable growth in the extension 
of voting rights to non-residents, to the point where external voting 
in some form is currently allowed by 115 countries and territories. 
(There is, of course, enormous variation in eligibility to vote, types 
of elections to which external voting applies, and voting procedures, 
in particular whether non-residents need to vote in person or can do 
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so by post or proxy.) The evidence of a trend is clear: countries have 
introduced external voting (for example, Mexico, whose innovation has 
prompted much interest on behalf of other Latin American countries 
such as Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala); others are extending it to 
new groups (for example, Ghana); the IOM has run out-of-country 
voting for post-confl ict countries with signifi cant diasporas such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan; and during the same period only a few countries have 
abolished external voting (for example Armenia, because of fears of 
unbalancing the political system).318 Turnout generally remains low 
compared to in-country participation, although an external voting 
population can still have a considerable impact on election results, as 
the next section demonstrates. Furthermore, it seems likely that as we 
work the kinks out of remote electronic voting, interest in external 
voting will continue to grow.319
Certainly, democratic politicians are doing their best to drive that 
demand by taking their campaigns to wherever the voters happen 
to be – especially those candidates whose message resonates with 
the kind of outward-looking voters who are likely to emigrate. The 
entrepreneurialism of the French diaspora in Britain matched the mood 
that swept Nicolas Sarkozy into power in Paris in May 2007. A few 
months later, the million or so Poles living in Britain and Ireland helped 
the liberal Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk (who campaigned on the 
streets of London, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dublin) to tip Jarosław 
Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party out of offi ce in Warsaw. Given that 
expatriate Poles are enjoying the benefi ts of EU membership, it is only 
logical that many of them – as well as their families at home in Poland 
who are receiving the funds they are remitting – would have voted 
for the pro-European Tusk.320 During the November 2007 Australian 
federal election campaign, the Mandarin-speaking Labor leader (now 
prime minister) Kevin Rudd advertised his wares on a seven metre high 
billboard in the Tsim Sha Tsui district of Hong Kong.321
External voting raises some diffi cult issues, which are yet to be 
fully explored in normative political theory.322 The right to vote is 
usually regarded as a universal right, and a corollary of citizenship. 
Furthermore, emigrants often retain a strong sense of connection with 
their homeland and a keen interest in the outcome of elections at home 
– individuals have even been known to FedEx their postal votes home 
to ensure they are counted in an election. In the Internet age, they can 
be just as well-informed as their friends at home. On the other hand, 
no right is unlimited. The demand for expatriate participation must 
be balanced against the principle of electoral legitimacy – the notion 
that elections should be determined by those who have a stake in the 
outcome. Emigrants are often largely beyond the jurisdiction of their 
home government. Generally they do not pay homeland income taxes, 
drive on homeland roads or use homeland services, so in that sense they 
feel the consequences of homeland elections less than residents. An 
appropriate balance must therefore be struck between emigrant rights 
and electoral legitimacy.323 There are also practical diffi culties and costs 
associated with running elections beyond a country’s borders while 
still attempting to guarantee the principles of universal, equal, secure 
and secret suffrage. To give one extreme example, the provision of an 
external vote in Afghanistan’s 2004 election to Afghans displaced to 
Pakistan and Iran was controversial because of Islamabad’s and Tehran’s 
strategic interests in Afghanistan. In the end, the IOM rejected an offer 
from Pakistan for extensive assistance with the poll because it might 
have impugned the electorate’s trust in the electoral process.324
At the very end of the continuum of diaspora political representation 
is the reservation of specifi c parliamentary seats for non-residents, the 
occupants of which are elected by non-residents. International IDEA 
reports that eleven countries enable their citizens abroad to elect their 
own representatives to the national legislature: Algeria, Angola, Cape 
Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Mozambique, Panama 
and Portugal. For example, French citizens abroad are represented in 
the Senate by twelve senators not elected directly but rather selected by 
a college of 150 elected members of the Conseil Supérieur des Français de 
l’Étranger. After Croatia gained independence, its fi rst president, Franjo 
Tuđman (who himself owed a great deal to Croatia’s large diaspora), 
established a special electoral district in the single-chamber parliament 
for overseas Croats; the exact number of seats assigned to it is now 
determined after every election depending on the number of votes cast 
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abroad.325 The most dramatic and colourful example of the election of 
diaspora representatives, however, is that of Italy in 2006-2007, when 
expatriate MPs helped to vote one prime minister out of offi ce and to 
vote confi dence in another.
5.7 Case study: Italians abroad and the Tremaglia law
There are thought to be about 60 million people of recent Italian 
descent outside Italy (roughly equivalent to Italy’s resident population), 
of whom perhaps fi ve million retain Italian citizenship.326 Italian 
emigration achieved operatic proportions in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Large communities of Italians formed in the US 
(especially in the period preceding the First World War), Western 
Europe, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Australia (especially after the 
Second World War). As Italy grew wealthier in the 1970s, the numbers 
slowed dramatically and the character of the emigrants changed from 
unskilled or semi-skilled workers to students, tourists, academics and 
white-collar workers.327
Italy has always recognised a generous version of jus sanguinis, 
according to which a person with a single Italian grandfather is entitled 
to citizenship. Furthermore, the Italian constitution confers voting 
rights on citizens regardless of their place of residence. Prior to 2001, 
however, Italian citizens living abroad wishing to vote had to return 
to their home town on polling day in order to cast their ballot. This 
situation was reversed by la legge Tremaglia (the Tremaglia law), which 
passed that year with near-unanimous support, and which awarded 
citizens a postal vote and their own parliamentary representation – 
twelve members in the Chamber of Deputies and six in the Senate. 
The law established a Circoscrizione Estero (Overseas Electorate) from 
which these eighteen representatives are elected, which is divided into 
four zones: Europe; South America; North and Central America; and 
Africa, Asia, Oceania and Antarctica.328
Several factors combined to produce this policy change. First, there 
was an element of partisan politics: the conventional wisdom was that 
increasing the participation of overseas voters would favour Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s incumbent Forza Italia-led government. 
Second, the cause was championed tenaciously over many years by an 
old-fashioned Italian nationalist MP, Mirko Tremaglia, whom Berlusconi 
appointed Minister for Italians Abroad. According to Stefano Silvestri of 
Italy’s Istituto Affari Internazionali (Institute of International Affairs), 
Tremaglia is a romantic idealist for whom this issue was never about 
votes, but about reviving eternal blood ties.329 Finally, Tremaglia’s 
campaign coincided with a notable revival in diaspora consciousness of 
the part of Italiani all’estero (Italians abroad). Italian society really only 
cohered in the mid-twentieth century, with the development of national 
institutions such as the media and the school system. Most Italian 
emigrants missed those changes: they were poorly educated, spoke a 
regional dialect rather than Italian, and were attached to their home 
villages rather than Rome (which they had probably never visited). 
However since the 1980s, there has been a global renewal of Italianità 
(Italianness), kicked off by Italy’s victory in the 1982 FIFA World Cup 
and powered by national political reconciliation and economic growth. 
The world got interested in Italy, and Italians abroad – who, thanks 
to new dual citizenship policies in their host countries, could obtain 
Italian citizenship – found a new pride in their homeland.330
The fi rst major test of the Tremaglia law was the general election 
of 2006 – the closest in the history of the republic – in which about 
one million Italians abroad cast a vote. To everyone’s surprise, the 
overseas bloc’s vote broke in favour of Romano Prodi’s centre-left 
coalition, which gained seven out of the twelve seats in the Chamber 
of Deputies and four out of the six slots in the Senate. Prodi quickly 
gained a comfortable majority in the Chamber, but the result in the 
Senate was too close to call until the external votes were counted and it 
emerged that Italians abroad had won Prodi a razor-thin 158-156 Senate 
majority. Symbolically at least, it seemed that Silvio Berlusconi had 
been tossed out of the prime minister’s residence, the Palazzo Chigi, by 
such unlikely individuals as Senator Nino Randazzo from Melbourne, 
Australia.331 The following year the eletti all’estero (overseas MPs) once 
again played a critical role in Italian politics by helping Prodi win a vote 
of confi dence from the Senate. Unconfi rmed press speculation had it 
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that a ‘foreign’ Italian senator from Argentina voted in favour of Prodi 
after coming under pressure from the president of Argentina.332
Senator Randazzo’s story provides a sense of the peculiarities of the 
system. In 1952, he left the island of Salina, off the coast of Sicily, to 
migrate to Australia. More than half a century later he was welcomed 
back by fl ag-waving island residents as Salina’s fi rst senator – except 
that he now represents people who live on the other side of the globe.333 
Randazzo and his colleague in the Chamber of Deputies, Marco Fedi, 
represent an enormous swathe of the world, stretching from Wellington, 
New Zealand to Aleppo, Syria; their constituents include Italian soldiers 
serving in Afghanistan, baristas in the inner Melbourne suburb of 
Carlton, and research scientists in Antarctica. Fedi’s take on the Italian 
system stands in striking contrast to Tremaglia’s. Rather than seeing it as 
an opportunity to export Italian culture, Fedi seeks to import the global 
experiences of Italians abroad. He cites as an example his ability to tell 
offi ceholders in Prato, a city in Tuscany with a large Chinese community, 
of his experiences with multiculturalism in Australia. Fedi believes that 
‘citizenship should be a contagious disease’ and sees the overseas MPs as 
a ‘precursore’ (precursor) of where the world is heading.334
Optimists like Fedi and academic Alastair Davidson see Italy’s external 
voting system as a far-sighted attempt to democratise globalisation.335 
Other observers report that the eletti all’estero are acting as an effective 
non-partisan lobby for emigrant interests. But there is no doubt that 
the electoral innovation is causing stresses and strains. The virtual 
electorates are enormous, staff and travel budgets are limited, and the 
year-round parliamentary sitting schedule is hard on families living 
abroad. Another external member of the Chamber, On. Gino Bucchino 
from Canada, says he has found the experience ‘quite frustrating’ 
and that, at least at fi rst, other MPs treated them like ‘Martians’.336 
The electoral roll is outdated, leading to many ballots being returned 
unopened to consulates; others had to be burned because poor local 
postal systems delivered them late.337 The online edition of the Roman 
daily La Repubblica posted a video allegedly depicting an instance of 
electoral fraud in favour of Randazzo and Fedi taking place in a Sydney 
garage, with a voter fi lling out multiple ballots.338 The video appears to 
have been manufactured, but it points to the diffi culties inherent in any 
external election.
There are also issues of legitimacy to consider. The link between 
elected and electors is weak from both a practical and conceptual 
point of view: one Italian woman asked, not unreasonably, how much 
australiani know about the problems of Italians in Italy.339 Because 
fewer votes are required to win an external seat than an in-country seat, 
the system does not represent ‘one Italian one vote’. The law confers 
rights but few obligations on those living in the Circoscrizione Estero, 
who are not subject to many of the laws on which their representatives 
are voting. Finally, it is not necessarily straightforward for these MPs 
to marry their loyalty to their constituents abroad with their duty to 
the Italian republic. Sergio Romano noted in Corriere della Sera, for 
instance, that during the Falklands War, Italians in Argentina tried 
to modify Rome’s pro-British policy; another well-known columnist, 
Beppe Severgnini, asks what position an Italian-Argentinian MP would 
adopt on Argentinian sovereign debt, given that many of that country’s 
bondholders are Italian.340 Would she be more concerned with creditors’ 
rights or debtors’ rights? The response of On. Franco Narducci, an 
Italian member from Switzerland – that the eletti all’estero can help 
to mediate such bilateral disagreements – is upbeat but not entirely 
convincing.341 Not all confl icts of interest are prone to mediation, and it 
is surely only a matter of time before a transnational parliamentarian is 
crunched between two directly opposing forces.
Not every host country was comfortable assisting the Italian 
authorities hold their election. Intriguingly, the country which was 
most violently opposed to the idea of its nationals voting for, and sitting 
in, a foreign parliament was Canada – the avatar of multiculturalism. 
Ottawa reluctantly agreed to participate in the process just months 
before Canada’s own federal election, allegedly on the urging of the then 
foreign minister, whose riding contained many voters of Italian ancestry. 
However, a review of the issue was announced shortly afterwards, and 
in 2007 the new conservative government decided against allowing 
Canadian citizens to participate in the future.342 Internal government 
notes reveal that Ottawa was concerned about the ‘impact of such a 
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practice on the integration of newcomers in an increasingly diverse 
Canada’. 343 Public opinion also appeared to be against it, with one 
television poll fi nding that 63% of respondents were opposed to the 
election of a Canadian resident to the Italian parliament. The Tremaglia 
law may also have run afoul of Canadians’ concern about immigrants 
treating the country as a ‘parking space’, a feeling which ran high after 
the Israel-Hizballah war of 2006, when Canada spent millions of dollars 
repatriating Lebanese-Canadians, some of whom promptly returned to 
Lebanon after the fi ghting had stopped.344 Not all Italian-Canadians 
were in favour of the ballot, either: one wrote in The Globe and Mail 
that it was ‘representation not only without taxation, but without 
responsibility to boot.’345
The Tremaglia law is a brave experiment, and there is something 
strangely impressive about it. It is also revealing – of the diffi culties 
governments face when they choose to operate outside their national 
jurisdictions, and of the inconsistencies in their responses to 
globalisation. It is remarkable how generous Italy is to its emigrants, 
given how ungenerous it can be to its immigrants. The transformation 
from a country of emigration into a country of immigration has been a 
struggle: as Donna Gabaccia observes, the Filipinos, Africans, Chinese, 
Turks, Egyptians and others who have arrived on its shores since 
the 1970s have faced the same kind of discrimination that Italians 
confronted in the US a century earlier.346 Even today it is easier for a 
New Yorker with an Italian grandfather to obtain Italian citizenship 
than it is for the child of an Albanian immigrant who has lived her 
whole life in Milan.347 One gets the impression that Italy is embracing 
globalisation and shrinking from it at the same time.
In conclusion, diasporas are affecting the politics of their host countries 
and their homelands – directly and in more subtle, perceptual ways. Many 
homelands are attempting to embrace their diasporas, however their 
reach is generally unimpressive. They are also extending voting rights 
to their citizens abroad (often without accompanying obligations), with 
variable results. It is not an easy thing to democratise globalisation.
Chapter 6
Long-distance nationalism:
Diasporas and security
There has always been a link between migration and security – as 
demonstrated, for instance, by the internment of Japanese-Americans 
during the Second World War. But after 9/11, the link was drawn much 
more clearly. Washington and other national capitals moved quickly 
to securitise migration by tightening borders and restricting entry 
policies. A related process occurred within the academy, as security 
scholars expanded their focus from violent confl ict as it occurs between 
or within states to how violence can be transmitted from state to 
state via migration fl ows.348 The global shifts described in this paper 
– including the growth in diaspora consciousness, the emergence of 
denser transnational networks, the end of the Cold War and the rise 
of new powers and non-state actors – raise important security issues. 
This chapter will deal with four: the relationship between diasporas, 
crime and espionage; the diasporic link to Jihadist terrorism (which 
is important, but not in the way that many suppose); the troubles that 
diasporas can cause back in their homelands, by fostering extremism 
and sustaining insurgencies; and the remarkable expansion in the 
demand for – and provision of – consular assistance and protection.
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6.1 Diasporas, crime and espionage
Most migrants are law-abiding people intent on creating economic 
opportunities for themselves and their families. Nevertheless, the 
diasporas which they form can provide shelter and foot soldiers for 
transnational ethnically-based criminal networks. Given the pace of 
modern communications and travel and the multiculturalism of the 
wealthy Western economies, ethnicity can be a very effective organising 
principle for a criminal network – a source of trust and social capital 
in a highly fl uid milieu.349 The US National Intelligence Council has 
observed that ‘Ethnic-based organized crime groups typically prey on 
members of their own diasporas and use them to gain footholds in new 
regions.’350 Fiona Adamson argues we are seeing something genuinely 
new: ‘the globalization of ethnically based criminal networks and their 
ability to forge alliances with one another – organizing themselves 
internationally, just as any legitimate business might do in a global 
economy.’ The activities of these networks affect the personal security 
of their victims, but of course their impact is felt more widely than that 
– for instance, on the funding of local confl icts in states such as Sierra 
Leone and Colombia, and on the governance of weak and broken states 
whose authority is susceptible to challenge.351
Observers are noticing a number of criminal groups expanding 
their operations into international diaspora communities, including 
the Chinese Liu Yong, Zhang Wei and Liang Xiao Min syndicates, the 
Japanese yakuza, the Russian Sizranskaya Groopirovka, the Ukrainian 
Savlokhov Group, the US-Italian Cosa Nostra and the Mexican 
Carillo Fuentes organisation. There are also examples of criminal 
methodologies being re-imported home via reverse diasporic fl ows, such 
as the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, which consist of Central American 
men who grew up in US-based street gangs before being deported 
from the US.352 Of all the ethnically-based networks, the expanding 
reach of the Chinese organisations, which extends to most cities with 
large ethnic Chinese populations, is causing the most alarm to law 
enforcement agencies. Sometimes the diasporic link is highly specifi c: 
the members of the Teochow, a powerful crime group in Europe known 
for its tight organisation and institutional loyalty, are connected by a 
common dialect and origin in a few villages near the city of Shantou in 
Guangdong province.353 In an infl uential article a decade ago, Willard 
Myers argued that the liberalisation of the PRC economy has created 
new opportunities for the Chinese criminal groups, which trade in 
drugs, people, weapons, counterfeit currency and other items through 
guanxi (reciprocal obligation) networks. Myers argued that some of 
these groups, which boast historical links to the Kuomintang, have 
had a parasitic relationship with Taiwan, expanding their activities 
in those countries to which Taipei has disbursed funds or directed 
investments.354
Diasporas have always been happy hunting grounds for homeland 
intelligence services.355 Since the 1980s, for instance, Chinese, Cuban, 
Israeli, South Korean, and Russian diasporans have been convicted 
of spying on the US on behalf of their homelands.356 In 2006, Britain 
charged a British corporal of Iranian descent, who had served as a 
translator for the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, with 
passing secrets to Tehran.357 Even non-state services have played on 
diasporic connections. RAND Corporation has pointed to Hizballah’s 
use of the Lebanese Shi’ite diaspora to gather intelligence which has 
informed attacks on Israeli targets abroad.358 In November 2007, a story 
broke about a Lebanese woman, Nada Nadim Prouty, who emigrated 
to America, obtained US citizenship by paying an unemployed man 
to marry her, found employment with the FBI and the CIA, and then 
allegedly provided government secrets to a Hizballah activist.359
The importance of diaspora espionage appears to be increasing in 
light of two developments. First, the liberalisation of the Eastern bloc 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall has altered the approach taken by the 
intelligence services of former Communist states to their diasporas. 
There is a trend towards such services viewing diasporans less as 
targets of information-gathering than as instruments of it; in turn, the 
decline of ideology as a motivating force and the rise of ethnicity makes 
diasporans more likely to answer the call. For instance, a former Russian 
intelligence offi cer makes this observation: ‘In the Soviet period, the 
Kremlin treated Russian refugees as traitors and enemies, but now it 
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is turning them into a fi fth column.’360 (Naturally, money remains a 
primary motivator for espionage, as demonstrated by the remarkable 
case of Gao Zhan, a Chinese sociologist affi liated with American 
University who was detained by Beijing in 2001 amid accusations she 
spied for Taiwan, released after pressure from Washington, but who 
subsequently admitted selling sensitive American technology to China 
even after her release.361)
The second, related, development is the rise of China as a great power. 
Beijing’s increasing confi dence, diplomatic dexterity and military 
capability would, if plotted on a chart, produce a growth curve that is 
every bit as impressive as the country’s recent economic performance. 
Observers have described China’s expanding clout in Southeast and 
Northeast Asia, its thickening ties with US treaty allies such as South 
Korea and Australia, its emerging infl uence in resource-rich countries 
in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, its role in the new 
Asian institutions such as the East Asia Summit and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, and its quickening interactions with the 
UN.362 Its espionage capabilities are also attracting the attention of 
analysts and offi cials.
In common with a number of states, Beijing still expends a good 
deal of energy monitoring its diaspora (in particular, members of Falun 
Gong). One ethnic Chinese resident of Australia observed recently: ‘For 
many Chinese here, it’s like we have two governments: the Australian 
one, who we pay taxes to, and the Chinese government that watches 
us.’363 But China also seeks to exploit its people to an unusual degree. 
The Chinese services take a ‘vacuum cleaner’ approach to collection. 
According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, Beijing is thought to run the 
largest human intelligence operation in the world, relying heavily 
for data-gathering on many thousands of Chinese visitors, students, 
business people, academics, journalists and other non-professional 
agents who are visiting or residing in target countries for legitimate 
purposes. ‘Gentle patriotic pressure is put on Chinese nationals to 
assist in this task, and many are willing to contribute to their nation’s 
continued economic and technological advances in this way. There 
is also, of course, the potential for coercive pressure to be applied by 
targeting family members who remain in China.’364 Western intelligence 
offi cials claim that Chinese diplomatic missions are also energetic in 
their efforts to turn overseas Chinese into informal agents of infl uence 
who ‘run in the same direction’ as Beijing. The favoured approach is 
to appeal to ‘Middle Kingdom pride’, which ‘runs deeper than state 
ideology’.
The FBI believes that China poses the most serious current espionage 
threat to the US, and America is clearly the main target for the Chinese 
services. However Chinese defectors to Canada and Australia have 
alleged that Beijing manages large numbers of informants in Chinese 
diaspora communities in these countries too, including a network of 
1000 spies and informers in Australia.365
Western security services have acknowledged that their intense 
focus on counter-terrorism since 9/11 has come at the expense of 
monitoring the informal intelligence networks of states such as China. 
The diffi culty with penetrating diasporic communities is not only the 
lack of language skills and cultural background: the painstaking process 
of gaining security clearances is doubly diffi cult when an applicant has 
spent substantial periods of time in foreign countries of interest.366 
As the services come to recruit more successfully from within foreign 
diasporas, a related problem arises: the need for ‘bicultural’ intelligence 
offi cers to negotiate their allegiances and differentiate between their 
ethnic and national loyalties.367 Host country security services will 
need to overcome both these diffi culties, because if diasporic loyalty 
continues to deepen in the future, diaspora espionage will pose a 
signifi cant security risk.
6.2 Diasporas and terrorism
There is no question that migratory fl ows can be conduits for terrorism. 
Robert Leiken, for instance, has argued that while states customarily 
see immigration from an economic perspective, terrorists view it from 
a strategic perspective.368 But are the banlieues of Marseilles and the 
ghettoes of Montreal breeding grounds for Jihadist terrorism? The 
thinking on the issue of Islam and diasporas can get confused. It is not 
WORLD WIDE WEBS
84 85
DIASPORAS AND SECURITY
helpful to think of a ‘Muslim diaspora’, both because Islam is not a 
national affi liation and also because of its diversity (for example, there 
are observant and ‘cultural’ Muslims; Sunni, Shia, Sufi s, Alevis, Ismailis 
and so on; liberals, traditionalists and literalists; and many different 
national Islamic traditions). For most Muslims, a national identity (for 
example, Egyptian, Indonesian or Australian) sits comfortably alongside 
their religious identity. It is true that some Muslims are focused, 
very broadly speaking, on Dar al-Islam, the historical lands of Islam. 
However most Islamists (that is, those with an ideological conception 
of Islam) are not concerned with a particular existing nation-state; the 
Islamic state they seek to establish would transcend existing national 
boundaries, which they see as Western impositions.
One well-known terrorism commentator has argued that ‘all attacks 
in the West, with the exception of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
have had some form of diaspora involvement… From this history, 
we must conclude that diasporas are vulnerable to indoctrination 
and participation in terrorist activity.’369 This statement is factually 
incorrect and analytically weak. The networks of Jihadist Islamism are 
actually quite different from diaspora networks: they are animated not 
by a national ideology but a religious one; their target audience is not 
a particular ethnic cohort but the umma, the worldwide community of 
Islam. Many of the same factors that are leading to the rise of diasporas 
– people movements, transport and communications technologies and, 
to some extent, policy decisions by states – are also contributing to 
the emergence of Jihadist Islamism, but this is a very different form of 
identity politics. It is not diasporas that turn disaffected young Muslims 
in the West into tools of destruction; to some extent at least, it is their 
resistance to diasporas. Some of the individuals who bombed New York, 
Pennsylvania, Washington, London and Madrid came from immigrant 
communities (others were short-term travellers) but one reason they 
were susceptible to the fundamentalist siren song is that they lacked 
their parents’ connection to the culture of their homeland – that is, they 
were insuffi ciently diasporic.
The most persuasive advocate of this thesis is the French scholar 
Olivier Roy. There are radical Muslim groups active in Europe 
with close links to their countries of origin, argues Roy, such as the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). However, the more dangerous form of 
radicalisation, which has motivated the most deadly attacks on Western 
targets, is different: it is ‘a transnational Islam divorced from its country 
of origin.’ Today’s radical Imams and their followers are not concerned 
primarily with regime change in their homelands: rather, they preach 
a deterritorialised Islam and fi ght a worldwide Jihad. They tend to 
reject traditional homeland culture: hence 9/11 leader Mohamed Atta’s 
refusal to be buried according to ‘un-Islamic’ Egyptian rites, which 
was reminiscent of the Saudi Wahhabis’ rejection of music, dance and 
novels, and the Taliban’s proscription of traditional Afghan cultural 
forms such as kite-fl ying and singing birds. Roy characterises most al-
Qaeda-style terrorists as ‘supranational and socially atomized’, usually 
with Westernised experiences of education, language and matrimonial 
affairs. ‘Before a Muslim in Europe can become a supranationalised 
radical, he… must lose most if not all connection to the diaspora.’ Neo-
fundamentalist movements do not ‘target communities with ties in a 
culture of origin, but individuals in doubt about their faith and identity… 
they address the universalist yearning of Muslims who cannot identify 
with any specifi c place or nation.’ In Roy’s view, the phenomenon of 
‘born-again Muslims’ in Europe ‘represents a radical disconnection 
between the country of origin and the new generations’.370
For Fukuyama, Roy’s analysis of radical Islamism in the West as 
a product of modern identity politics rather than something that is 
necessarily inherent to Islam means that ‘the problem of jihadist 
terrorism will not be solved by bringing modernization and democracy 
to the Middle East.’371 How can such terrorism be defeated? The problem 
is far from simple, but certain principles fl ow from Roy’s argument. 
Western security services must be vigilant in pursuing violent Jihadists 
who shelter in diaspora communities but careful to explain to the wider 
public that they form a tiny minority of those communities.372 Immigrant 
communities are not to blame for terrorism, and contrary to the lazy 
assertions of some commentators and politicians, neither is diasporic 
feeling among immigrants. Diaspora consciousness may actually 
reduce the alienation felt by Muslims living in Western countries. It is 
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noticeable that Turks in Europe – who have, as we have seen, strong 
diasporic bonds to Turkey – seem to be less susceptible to universalist 
Islam than Arabs, and Turks have not counted prominently among 
Jihadist operatives in the West. Indeed, the International Crisis Group 
has observed that the experience of Germany, with its predominantly 
Turkish Muslim minority, ‘shows that a signifi cant Muslim population 
at the heart of Europe need not produce either violent Islamist groups 
or destabilising social unrest.’373 National governments need to be 
careful, therefore, that frustration at their inability to keep this menace 
beyond their borders does not lead them to overreact domestically with 
regulations which alienate the very diaspora communities they need to 
keep on side.
6.3 Diasporas and homeland security
There is a substantial literature on the topic of diasporic support 
for extreme and even violent political behaviour at home, which 
demonstrates that ‘the communities wrapped up in an ethnonational 
confl ict often extend far beyond the arena of fi ghting.’374 The scholar 
Benedict Anderson calls this phenomenon ‘long-distance nationalism’, 
and worries that it ‘creates a serious politics that is at the same time 
radically unaccountable. The participant rarely pays taxes in the country 
in which he does his politics; he is not answerable to its judicial system… 
he need not fear prison, torture, or death, nor need his immediate family. 
But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money 
and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer 
information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences 
in the zones of their ultimate destinations.’375
The classic assumption in this fi eld is that in relation to homeland 
disputes, diasporans may be ‘unwilling to accept a compromise because 
on the one hand the confl ict is of low cost to them and on the other hand 
the confl ict may have become an integral part of exile identity’.376 The 
interests of diaspora and homeland, in other words, are rarely identical. 
Yossi Shain has observed, for instance, that a diaspora may perceive a 
homeland territory’s ‘identity function’ more clearly than its practical 
value, so that ‘altering the geographic confi guration of the homeland 
state for the sake of peace may be more disturbing to some diaspora 
elements than to some segments of the homeland community.’377 We see 
this trend in relation to historic bilateral disputes, such as the hostility 
of some Armenian diasporans to improved relations between Armenia 
and Turkey, and international political negotiations such as the 2004 
talks on the future of Cyprus, when Turkish-Cypriots abroad were 
sometimes more negative about the UN’s compromise proposal than 
the Turks of northern Cyprus.378
Similarly, some of the more uncompromising fi gures in the Israeli-
Palestinian confl ict live outside the Holy Land. Shain notes that while 
Yitzhak Rabin’s government enjoyed the support of most Jewish 
Americans in relation to the Oslo peace accord, it ‘also became the 
target of venomous opposition from more conservative sectors of 
the diaspora. In addition to outright hostility directed at government 
offi cials, diaspora groups that opposed the peace process fi nanced a 
public relations campaign against the accords, gave fi nancial support to 
the Jewish settler movement in the occupied territories, and established 
US affi liates of key right-wing Israeli parties to fi nancially support 
their political campaigns against Rabin and his Labor Party successors, 
Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak.’379 In the prelude to the Annapolis 
summit of November 2007, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert publicly 
rejected assertions by some American Jewish leaders that the status of 
Jerusalem was not an Israeli issue but ‘a Jewish one’.380 On the Palestinian 
side, pragmatists living in the Palestinian territories, such as Professor 
Sari Nusseibeh, the Rector of Al-Quds University, are often attacked by 
radicals abroad. The criticism fl owed in the opposite direction in a March 
2007 debate in Doha on the right of return. A fascinating exchange took 
place between Ali Abunimeh, a Palestinian refugee who lives in Ireland 
and the US and who established the Electronic Intifada, and Bassem 
Eid, the founder of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, 
who lives in the Aqabat Jaber refugee camp in Jericho. ‘He is not living 
in a refugee camp’, said Eid, ‘and I wish that Mr Abunimeh one day will 
come to replace me in Aqabat Jaber in Jericho for one month… we know 
ourselves much more than any other Palestinian who is living outside 
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who has no connection to the realities.’381 The divide between diasporic 
and local attitudes is sometimes similar to Israeli novelist Amos Oz’s 
dichotomy between a Shakespeare play and a Chekhov one. At the end 
of a Shakespearian tragedy, every wrong is righted and justice is done, 
but the stage is strewn with dead bodies; a Chekhovian tragedy, on the 
other hand, ends with the company disillusioned and heartbroken, 
but alive.382 The diaspora mindset matters, however, because as Shain 
records, diasporas can act as independent actors, converting peace 
negotiations from a two-level game into a three-level game.383
Security threats can be created when refugee fl ows pool in diasporic 
communities on the borders of the home state. ‘All too often’, argue 
Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, ‘where large numbers of refugees 
go, instability and war closely follow.’384 Hutus fl eeing Rwanda for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after the Rwandan genocide of 
1994 launched cross-border attacks on the new Tutsi-led government 
and helped precipitate a civil war, regime collapse and millions of deaths 
in the DRC.385 Palestinian refugees participated in the Black September 
confl ict between the Jordanian state and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and catalysed Lebanon’s civil war.386 Afghani 
refugee camps in Pakistan in the 1980s functioned as incubators for 
the Taliban – and more than three million Afghanis remain outside 
their country today.387 More than 2.2 million people (almost 10% of 
the population) have fl ed Iraq for neighbouring countries since the US 
invasion.388 Byman and Pollack warn that in the event of an all-out civil 
war in Iraq in the future, this stream could become a fl ood – which could 
upset delicate sectarian balances and provoke unrest in Syria, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It would also have serious implications for 
Iraq’s security, not least because ‘the immediate presence of hundreds 
of thousands of traumatized Shiites could… generate domestic pressure 
on Tehran to intervene directly in Iraq’.389
Moving beyond the home country’s immediate borderlands, diasporas 
in the distant West have long played a role in funding and supporting 
insurgencies against the home regime. RAND observes that insurgents 
in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, 
Russia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Northern Ireland and Kosovo have 
all received diasporic support in the form of money, arms or recruits. 
For example, diaspora Kosovars were, according to the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, ‘the most radicalized part of 
the Kosovar Albanian community’ and were heavily implicated in the 
establishment of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).390 Several hundred 
Albanian-Americans fought in the KLA’s Batalioni Atlantiku (Atlantic 
Brigade): American journalists in Kosovo interviewed KLA soldiers 
with thick accents from the Bronx, Chicago and Detroit.391 Insurgents 
generate this kind of support in a number of ways: by stoking emigrants’ 
long-distance nationalism, by playing on their guilt, and by coercion.392 
Although the evidence is not categorical, it seems that diasporas can, 
in the words of economist Paul Collier, ‘make life for those left behind 
much more dangerous’. Collier authored a World Bank study in 2000 
which found that a post-confl ict country with a large diaspora in the US 
is six times more likely to relapse into confl ict than a similar country 
with a small diaspora.393
In the last couple of decades, three developments have changed 
the way diasporas interact with homeland insurgencies. First, the 
advancements in transport and communications outlined in Chapter 1 
have concentrated diasporic minds on diffi culties at home and improved 
the ability of insurgents to capitalise on this awareness.394 In 1992, 
Benedict Anderson decried the long-distance nationalist who ‘fi nds it 
tempting to play identity politics by participating… in the confl icts of 
his imagined Heimat [homeland] – now only fax-time away.’395 Since 
then, of course, technologies have been developed, commercialised 
and distributed globally which bring such a person much closer to 
his homeland than does the fax. Second, the relative importance of 
diasporic support for insurgencies surged in the post-Cold War period, 
not only because of the increased frequency of ethnic and intrastate 
confl icts, but also because Washington and Moscow withdrew their 
support from some of their proxies. As RAND noted, state sponsorship 
of insurgencies, for so long a prominent feature of superpower rivalry, 
was ‘no longer the only, or necessarily the most important, game in 
town.’396 However the third development – the attacks on the US on 
9/11 – may have interrupted this trend by rendering anti-state violence 
WORLD WIDE WEBS
90 91
DIASPORAS AND SECURITY
less acceptable, both to diasporas and host governments. Historically, 
host governments have been slow to close down these connections 
to insurgents – in part because of the diffi culty in separating out 
insurgency supporters from the rest of the diaspora and the political 
costs of doing so,397 but also because the effect of the support was felt in 
the homeland, not the host country. After 9/11, Western governments 
realised they could not afford to be sanguine about faraway terrorism, 
and their security services acted accordingly.
These developments can be observed in the cases of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (IRA). In 2001, RAND regarded the Tigers’ experience as ‘the 
apex of how an insurgent organization can exploit a diaspora for its 
own ends… The LTTE network straddles the globe and effectively 
integrates the Tamil diaspora into one overarching external system that 
constitutes the lifeline for LTTE guerillas on the ground.’398 The Tigers 
raised ‘war taxes’ and received donations from Tamil communities in 
countries such as the UK, Australia and Canada, as well as income 
from NGOs, criminal activities and Tamil-run businesses (for which 
the LTTE sometimes covered the initial capital costs). The exiled Tiger 
leadership was sheltered by the diaspora, and pro-Tiger websites run by 
expatriates were more sophisticated than Colombo’s offi cial efforts.399 
Many of these benefi ts still accrue today, but 9/11 changed the game 
for the Tigers, for several years at least. Western security forces cracked 
down on LTTE front organisations; Tamil emigrants found it easier to 
avoid forced remittances; and diaspora leaders encouraged the LTTE 
to pursue a diplomatic solution to the confl ict. Diasporic pressure 
appears to have been one of several factors which led to the LTTE’s 
unilateral ceasefi re declaration in December 2001.400 (Four years later, 
however, hostilities between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE 
resumed.)
The succour which Irish republicans have long received from 
Irish-Americans was institutionalised, after the commencement 
of the Troubles in the 1960s, in the form of the Irish Northern Aid 
Committee (NORAID) and other organisations. For several decades, 
some of these organisations provided funds and weapons (including the 
Provos’ rifl e of choice, the Armalite) to the IRA, shielded IRA fugitives 
and supported the families of republican prisoners; the broader Irish-
American community lent political clout to the republican cause. 
The US government (which was not a target of IRA operations) 
‘interfered only fi tfully with the IRA’s efforts to raise money or acquire 
weapons.’401 In the 1990s, however, Washington waded right into the 
issue. The US was motivated in part by President Bill Clinton’s personal 
interest, but it was also liberated by the end of the Cold War, which 
had, according to Feargal Cochrane, ‘glued the Northern Ireland confl ict 
into the international political system in a manner that made US policy 
innovations extremely unlikely.’ (The ‘bipolar reductionist split’ pushed 
Washington and London together and led republican paramilitaries to 
align themselves with the PLO, the African National Congress and the 
Libyan regime.)402 An American push for peace was also urged by the 
increasingly prosperous Irish-American community, for whom images 
of IRA operations were highly disturbing.403 Cochrane argues that ‘the 
evolution of the Irish-American lobby, from its demands for immediate 
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland to its role as cheerleader and 
core-funder of incremental peaceful change, facilitated a constructive 
engagement with the US administration.’ Furthermore, ‘Irish-America’s 
soft power was a vital factor in leading republicans towards the view 
that democratic politics rather than paramilitary violence was the way 
forward.’404
The 9/11 attacks on the US (which in many cases were met by Irish-
American police and fi re offi cers) further reduced any tolerance within 
the community for terrorist activities.405 President Bush’s former special 
envoy for Northern Ireland, Mitchell Reiss, argues that Irish America’s 
infl uence on the peace process was felt very clearly in early 2005, after 
the IRA’s robbery of the Northern Bank and the murder of Robert 
McCartney in Belfast. Prominent Irish-Americans such as Senator Ted 
Kennedy and the broader community ‘delivered very strong public and 
private messages to the IRA (and Sinn Féin) that the IRA simply had 
to end the war, commit itself to a purely peaceful and democratic path 
forward and decommission its weapons. And six months after the 2005 
St Patrick’s Day events, all of these steps had taken place.’406
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Most of the offi cial and scholarly attention, with good reason, is 
given to what Østergaard-Nielsen calls ‘the dark side of diaspora 
politics’.407 However as the LTTE and IRA cases demonstrate, diasporas 
can play a role in dampening confl ict and encouraging dialogue; their 
remittances can fuel development as well as violence.408 Whether 
the overall effect will be positive or negative in any particular case is 
not easily predictable, but it probably depends on a range of factors 
including the history of the diaspora in question and its reasons for 
dispersal, its relations with the host society (including its infl uence and 
economic success) and its relationship with the homeland. It is too soon 
to say just what effect new technologies such as the internet will have 
on the nexus between diasporas and homeland security (or, indeed, 
how long the chilling effect of 9/11 will last). These technologies are, 
on the one hand, an operational boon to groups such as the LTTE, and 
they enable visual representations of violence and repression that are 
invaluable in radicalising far-fl ung populations.409 On the other hand, 
we used to think that diaspora communities (for example, elements of 
Irish America) funded extremists at home because they were not fully 
aware of positive developments that had occurred since they had left 
– that is, they had an old black-and-white image in their head. How 
will this change as people fi nd it easier to interact with their homeland 
and stay up-to-date? Might they become more moderate when the 
black-and-white photograph is replaced with a virtual tour?410 Collier is 
certainly right to advise that the international community should build 
diasporas in to peace processes, emphasising that even if diasporans are 
not bearing the costs of extremism and violence, their countrymen and 
women are. Host governments, for instance, should put clear limits on 
the activities of diaspora organisations within their jurisdiction.411
6.4 The protection of diasporas
Diasporas can pose security threats – but they are also subject to them. If 
9/11 demonstrated the diffi culties of defending the American homeland 
against asymmetric attacks, for instance, how can Washington protect 
the millions of Americans who live outside their homeland? New 
threats to Western nationals abroad are coinciding with escalating 
demands for consular assistance, and foreign ministries around the 
world are groaning (often literally) under the weight of public and 
political expectations. Of course, consular protection is not only a 
diaspora issue: many people requiring help are short-term travellers, 
not emigrants; and many individuals who identify with a homeland 
may not actually be nationals of that country who are eligible for 
assistance. Nevertheless, diasporans are an important constituency for 
consular services, and a problematic one: in most cases the homeland 
government knows little about them; and because they are more deeply 
embedded in their host countries than tourists or business travellers, 
they can be harder to protect.
As the strategic analyst Hugh White writes, the ‘basic idea of 
statehood suggests a very limited role for governments in protecting 
their citizens overseas. The state’s primary responsibility is to protect 
its citizens – and others – while they are in its sovereign territory. This 
is the area in which the state has the monopoly of legitimate force. Leave 
the state’s sovereign territory, and the state has neither the means nor 
the responsibility to protect you. Of course it has never been that simple.’ 
There is another, contradictory, element of national sovereignty: what 
the Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy describes as ‘a very old 
theory holding that all individuals belong to some sovereign and that 
this identifi cation follows them wherever they may go.’ It is this belief 
which informed the Romans’ claim of immunity from local authorities: 
‘Civis Romanus Sum’ (‘I am a Roman citizen’).412 Over the course of the 
17th and 18th centuries, as international travel began to reach signifi cant 
levels, these two principles resolved into a general rule that ‘citizens 
abroad were to submit to the full operation of local law.’413 Sometimes 
the balance shifted back to the earlier principle, as with the imperial 
powers’ negotiation of extraterritoriality for their citizens in the early 
19th century, or Britain’s infamous expedition to Abyssinia in 1868 
to rescue a few missionaries and other hostages from the clutches of 
Emperor Theodore II, described memorably in George MacDonald 
Fraser’s novel, Flashman on the March.414 But if consular questions have 
developed into political spats and even military confl icts from time to 
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time, the long-term tendency has been towards a more limited view of 
governments’ responsibilities to their citizens abroad.
However, several interrelated factors – the surge in international 
travel and migration, the media’s appetite for stories about fellow 
nationals in extraordinary situations, and a string of recent global events 
with major consular implications, including 9/11, the Bali bombings of 
2002 and 2005, the Madrid bombing and Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, 
the London bombing and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Israel-
Hizballah war of 2006 – have driven up demand (from both diaspora 
and homeland populations) for the provision of consular assistance 
to nationals abroad. Diplomats complain that this issue keeps them 
awake at night – and with good reason, for where consular services are 
judged to be insuffi cient, the criticism is immediate, as the Canadian, 
Australian, Swedish, Norwegian and New Zealand foreign ministries, 
to name only a few, have found recently.415 These kinds of developments 
are not occurring everywhere, and indeed where they are taking place 
they are sometimes causing a backlash, with complaints about dual 
citizenship and demands that recipients of assistance refund the cost to 
the government.416 Nevertheless the trend is reasonably clear.
The issue is also causing new bilateral headaches. For example, 
Indonesia is thought to have more than a million citizens working in 
neighbouring Malaysia, whom it regards as pahlawan devisa (foreign 
exchange heroes). However their presence is a sensitive issue for both 
sides: on the one hand, Malaysians believe the Indonesians cause crime; 
on the other hand, given that the two countries are bangsa serumpun 
(sharing the same roots) but Malaysia is smaller and signifi cantly richer, 
Indonesians are alert to slights against their kin. The issue is becoming 
increasingly serious, both because of the growth of the Indonesian 
population in Malaysia and because Indonesia’s democratisation 
means that Jakarta is now more susceptible to public pressure. The 
August 2007 beating of an Indonesian karate referee by plainclothes 
Malaysian police in Nilai, a town near Kuala Lumpur, for example, 
led to protest demonstrations in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities, 
threats to ‘sweep’ Malaysian citizens in Indonesia, calls for a revival of 
the 1960s ganyang Malaysia (crush Malaysia) campaigns from the days 
of Konfrontasi, articles from commentators querying Malay solidarity, 
appeals for boycotts, and eventually an apology from Malaysian Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi to Indonesian President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono.417
Homeland governments are acting to meet the new public demand 
for consular assistance. White argues that consular work has moved 
from the margins to near the centre of the priorities of Australia’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), for example, and 
the numbers bear out that claim. The number of Australians receiving 
consular assistance doubled from 1996-1997 to 2003-2004, and it will 
have leapt again since then. However, far from satisfying the demand, 
the provision of assistance is only driving demand higher: ‘As the 
Government has undertaken more and more high-cost, highly-publicised 
consular activities… Australians have come to expect the same levels of 
support if they fi nd themselves in trouble, and the Government fi nds 
itself trapped in a cycle of rising expectations.’418 Filipino politicians are 
highly sensitive to the acute political issue of emigrant protection. The 
execution of Filipina maid Flor Contemplacion in Singapore in 1995 
led to the passage of legislation known as ‘the migrant workers’ Magna 
Carta’; the kidnapping of a Filipino truck driver in Iraq in 2004 caused 
President Macapagal-Arroyo to pull the Philippines out of the US-led 
coalition; and an agency, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration 
(OWWA), has been established to care for emigrants.419
Perhaps the most interesting case is that of China. Although 
Beijing’s attitude to the protection of overseas Chinese has waxed and 
waned over the last couple of centuries, the default position – which 
is consistent both with diplomatic imperatives and the norm of non-
interference in the affairs of sovereign states – has been to remain aloof. 
However, a new attitude seems to be emerging along with China’s rising 
global infl uence, the steep increase in the number of Chinese travelling 
overseas and the growing presence and visibility of Chinese companies 
and their employees in unstable foreign markets. In the wake of public 
pressure, the Chinese foreign ministry has announced it is retooling 
itself in order to provide better consular services and the China Daily 
has reported on ‘unprecedented government efforts’ to help Chinese 
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people in trouble overseas. ‘Serving the people is the essence of 
China’s diplomacy’, says the ministry’s director of consular affairs, and 
diplomats have been instructed to ‘go all out to help Chinese citizens 
in accordance with international laws.’420 The last two years have 
seen some revealing instances of this approach. In late 2005, Chinese 
offi cials expressed sharp displeasure over the mistreatment of ethnic 
Chinese by Malaysian authorities after images were produced of a naked 
woman being forced to do squats in a police lock-up. It was only after a 
Malaysian minister travelled to Beijing to apologise that it emerged that 
the woman in question was actually an ethnic Malay.421 (The incident 
was reminiscent of the 1904 abduction of a presumed American citizen, 
Ion Perdicaris, by a Berber chieftain, which led President Theodore 
Roosevelt to send a squadron of warships to Morocco for his rescue. In 
fact, however, Mr Perdicaris had renounced his American citizenship 
forty years earlier.422) China also muscled up to Pakistan in July 
2007, when intelligence analysts and diplomats reported that China’s 
strongly-expressed concern about militant attacks on Chinese citizens 
in Islamabad suspected of ‘loose morals’ was critical in President Pervez 
Musharraf’s decision to lay siege to the Red Mosque – a rare direct 
confrontation between his government and the radicals.423
In the Southwest Pacifi c, China is engaged in a struggle for 
geopolitical advantage with Taiwan, involving a great deal of 
chequebook diplomacy.424 An Australian journalist, Graeme Dobell, 
argues that Beijing has ‘achieved a leading position in a surprisingly 
short time’ through the concentration of diplomatic resources (China is 
now thought to have more diplomats in the Pacifi c than either the US 
or the regional metropole, Australia) and fi nancial assistance (namely, 
the provision of ‘an array of relatively cheap goodies – offi cial visits to 
China for politicians, a willingness to construct buildings and sporting 
facilities, and no overt interest at all in “governance” apart from the 
crucial issue of diplomatic infl uence.’) At the same time, the Chinese 
diaspora in the island states of Melanesia is growing rapidly with the 
arrival of ‘new Chinese’ emigrants who are, unlike their predecessors 
(who had ‘fl ed the chaos and poverty of their homeland’), ‘proud sons 
and daughters of the new China.’425 In 2006, anti-Chinese riots broke 
out in Solomon Islands and Tonga, motivated partly by prejudice and 
envy but also by anger at political interference by foreign powers, 
especially Taipei. China responded by leasing foreign charter planes 
to airlift hundreds of overseas Chinese out of both Honiara and 
Nuku’alofa.426 In the same year, Beijing also organised evacuations 
from violent situations in East Timor and Lebanon.427 This kind of 
exercise is not unusual for developed countries, but it is a new thing 
for China. Beijing has also promised to extend consular assistance to 
Taiwanese citizens in emergencies. According to a consular offi cial: ‘We 
always consider Taiwan compatriots our own fl esh and blood and will 
use all our resources to provide consular assistance and protection for 
them without any reservation. In this way, we can let them feel the 
motherland’s love for them.’428
The concern, of course, is that if states become more forward-leaning 
in asserting their right to protect their citizens when they are outside 
their borders, international disputes are sure to follow. That is especially 
the case when the states in question are rising in both ambition and 
capacities. It is not diffi cult to imagine, for instance, circumstances in 
which a distressing situation involving overseas Chinese somewhere 
in Southeast Asia escalated into confl ict. What if communal violence 
in Fiji caused a future Indian government to send some of its spanking 
new warships to the Southwest Pacifi c in order to protect Fijians of 
Indian origin?
The other problem is, in a sense, the opposite one: governments are 
not well equipped to deliver the enhanced consular protection they 
are setting out so enthusiastically to provide. There are clear limits to 
governments’ knowledge of conditions in foreign countries – and, even 
more so, to their ability to extend assistance where required. This is 
particularly the case in relation to nationals who have lived overseas 
for long periods of time: even though they may regard themselves as 
diaspora members, their homeland government is unlikely to know 
much about their situation. For example, DFAT estimates that only 
about 14% of Australians residing abroad have chosen to sign up 
with the online register it maintains in order to locate Australians in 
an emergency.429 States are, in other words, accepting new risks and 
WORLD WIDE WEBS
98 99
responsibilities that they are unable to bear, and it is bound to get them 
into all kinds of trouble. One recent example of such trouble, involving 
a short-term traveller rather than a diasporan, was the case of former 
deputy German foreign minister, Jürgen Chrobog. In 2003, Chrobog 
helped win the release of European hostages kidnapped in the Sahara, 
personally delivering a large cash ransom to intermediaries of the 
kidnappers. The German foreign ministry had cautioned its nationals 
against travelling in Algeria at that time, and subsequent to those events 
Chrobog opined that some Germans travelling overseas have a ‘social 
security mentality’. Unfortunately he was then himself kidnapped along 
with his family while holidaying in a remote part of Yemen – despite 
foreign ministry warnings that Germans travelling there were in danger 
of abduction.430
Hugh White neatly sums up the paradox of modern consular 
assistance in this way:
It is one of the stranger characteristics of foreign policy 
in the 21st century that at a time when globalisation is 
thought by many to be making the nation-state less and 
less important, as global citizens seem increasingly to cut 
themselves loose from national roots to lead cosmopolitan 
lives, governments around the world… seem to face ever-
rising expectations from citizens that they will accept 
greater and greater responsibility for the safety of their 
citizens overseas. So while citizenship for the individual 
seems to mean less and less, the responsibilities expected 
of (and accepted by) the state to protect citizens abroad 
seem to grow.431
The rise of diasporas has meaningful security implications, then – 
for organised crime, espionage, the terrorist threat against the West, 
insurgencies and peace processes, and the protection of nationals 
abroad.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
The evidence set out in this paper confi rms that diasporas are getting 
larger, thicker and stronger. Indeed, the consistency of the changes 
is striking. Diaspora consciousness is rising among many different 
communities, from Italians to Indonesians; diasporas are organising 
themselves better, like the New Zealanders, and sometimes learning 
from each other, as with Indian-Americans and Jewish Americans. 
Homeland societies as dissimilar as Australia and Israel are revising 
their opinions of their diasporas as the stigma attached to emigration 
declines; homeland capitals such as New Delhi and Ankara are engaging 
more energetically with their people abroad, sometimes with positive 
results and sometimes with perverse ones. Both phenomena are visible 
in the case of China: diaspora Chinese are taking more interest in their 
Chinese identity; and Beijing is taking more interest in its emigrants, 
collecting information from them and providing more robust consular 
protection to them. Meanwhile, host countries are struggling with the 
diffi cult questions raised by more assertive and visible diasporic groups 
within their own national communities and are enduring periodic 
outbreaks of diasporaphobia.
The narratives of many of these national diasporas is being driven by a 
number of common factors, in particular migration growth, technological 
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changes which are connecting, transporting and sometimes narrowing 
people, and major geopolitical events. The end of the Cold War has been 
especially infl uential, redefi ning diasporas (as in the case of Russia), 
altering homeland diaspora strategies (for example, Morocco), bringing 
forward rising powers such as China and remaking their policies, 
spreading democratisation and external voting to new territories, and 
changing host country attitudes towards diasporic homelands (as with 
US policy towards India and the confl ict in Northern Ireland).
Naturally, the developments have not been all one way. Many 
diasporans are increasingly interested in their homelands, but some 
could not care less. Diasporas can cause security threats, but they can 
also help to calm them: Irish-Americans and overseas Tamils have done 
both. Diasporas may even help to inoculate some populations from 
viruses such as Jihadist terrorism. Even if there are inconsistencies and 
contradictions, however, the trend is clear.
The tightening of diasporic connections is being felt around the 
world. The national identities of both host countries and homelands 
are being affected: it is commonplace to celebrate the cultural richness 
diasporans bring to their host countries, but the Victorian terrace 
houses of Anatolia demonstrate that the effect is not unidirectional. 
Remittances have become a critical source of external fi nancing for 
developing countries such as the Philippines, India and Mexico – one 
with great developmental potential. Gold-collar workers as well as 
blue-collar workers are contributing to their homelands’ economies. 
Diaspora networks are stimulating trade and investment. Furthermore, 
the political fl ows from diaspora to homeland – in the form of ideas, 
infl uence and votes – may turn out to be just as powerful as the fi nancial 
fl ows. Diasporans are infl uencing host country politics, as we saw with 
the congressional resolution on the question of the Armenian genocide. 
Emigrants are serving as ambassadors for their homelands (both for 
good and for ill); they can also function as instruments of their host 
country’s soft power, as is the case with Indian-Americans. From the 
security perspective, diasporas are, as the British Ministry of Defence 
put it, ‘a medium for the international transmission of social risk’, 
including transnational crime, espionage, inter-communal violence 
and terrorism;432 but it seems they can also mitigate risk, by supporting 
young people who might otherwise fall prey to more dangerous forms 
of identity politics.
The existence of a large diasporic community affects the defi nition 
(and the achievement) of the national interest – and of course the interests 
of homeland and diaspora are rarely identical. Events affect diasporas 
differently from homeland populations; they raise new problems that 
governments are not used to handling; they are demanding, but it is 
diffi cult to make demands of them. Diasporas rope countries together 
more tightly: if a large number of your people reside in another country, 
for instance, and they contribute a large chunk of your GDP, then the 
other country’s economic policies (not to mention its immigration and 
internal security systems) help determine your national welfare.
Diasporas deserve our attention, therefore – and all the more so 
if the trends identifi ed in this paper continue. Let us speculate for a 
minute about developments in the future, if emigrants feel increasingly 
enmeshed in the national endeavours of their homelands. What if 
homeland electoral authorities were to enfranchise diasporas in order to 
resolve vexed national questions: as The Economist notes, ‘just imagine 
what would happen in Ireland, north and south of the border, if Irish-
Americans were allowed to vote in Ireland’s or Ulster’s elections.’433 
What if ethnic lobbies continue to grow in strength, splintering 
the foreign policies of democratic states? How can police forces and 
security services prevent ethnically-based criminal and espionage 
networks from developing parasitic relationships with increasingly 
cohesive diasporas? Will we see states bumping into each other as they 
strive to protect people who are emotionally, but not physically, part of 
the nation? Could a rising demand for consular assistance lead rising 
(or falling) states into adventurism and the use of force? Finally, what 
kind of a backlash will we see against the rise of diasporas? Could anti-
immigrant feeling in countries such as the US, Britain, France and Italy 
cause governments to restrict immigration and thereby choke off the 
remittance fl ows to which some countries are growing addicted?434 Will 
we see host countries demanding exclusive loyalty from those people 
living within their borders – and if so, will they forswear the role of 
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sovereign in relation to their own emigrants, refusing to grant rights to 
or extract obligations from them?
To date, few governments have been able to bring this kind of 
consistency to their approach. Thus Italy gives the vote to its emigrants 
but is niggardly towards its immigrants. Australia makes it harder to 
gain citizenship in the fi rst place, but easier to regain it once it has been 
lost. After gaining independence, Croatia allocated nearly twice as many 
parliamentary seats to diaspora Croats as it did to ethnic minorities within 
Croatia.435 Nicolas Sarkozy campaigned for votes abroad and he plainly 
believes that French emigrants remain French; in fact, he seems to see 
them as the personifi cation of the France he wishes to build. Yet he takes 
a different view when it comes to residents of France: when a woman of 
North African heritage questioned Sarkozy about his own family roots in 
the Hungarian nobility, for instance, he replied: ‘You are not Algerian, but 
French. And I am not Hungarian.’436 In 1999, Ottawa refused to allow the 
Canadian newspaper magnate Conrad Black to sit in the British House 
of Lords,437 but a few years later it allowed Canadian citizens to vote and 
stand for the Italian parliament. When it comes to diasporas, in other 
words, many governments are displaying bipolar tendencies.
The other notable feature of homeland governments’ responses, apart 
from their inconsistency, is their ineffectiveness. Points of principle (for 
example, whether to grant representation to non-residents) are diffi cult 
enough; the other problem is implementation. Homeland governments 
are reaching out to their diasporas, but they are not good at operating 
beyond their borders. New diaspora institutions are often ineffective; 
accommodating diasporans in your democratic processes is not easy; 
consular assistance is hard to deliver and liable to cause diffi culties. 
The truth is that diasporas are not easily managed. Perhaps nations can 
be global, as the Italian-Australian MP Marco Fedi argues, but states 
usually cannot. Of course, this leaves the fi eld open for fi rst movers. 
Governments that manage to devise effective means of dealing with their 
emigrant populations are likely to gain a signifi cant advantage over their 
rivals. If they can draw their emigrants into the national mainstream, 
they will make their countries larger – not only demographically but 
also culturally, politically and economically.
The principles which should guide homeland governments’ dealings 
with their diasporas, at least in the short to medium term, are modesty and 
pragmatism. Designing public policy in relation to a foreign population 
is inherently diffi cult. The creation of large new bureaucracies such as 
diaspora ministries would please diaspora organisations, but is unlikely 
to capture real benefi ts for homelands. A better approach would be to 
proceed gradually; work across departments rather than establishing 
new ones; observe what works and distribute those practices throughout 
the bureaucracy; ensure that government rhetoric does not get too far 
ahead of the reality; and be driven by emigrants’ preferences rather than 
trying to hitch unwilling individuals to some grand national strategy.438 
Working pragmatically with diasporans while they are abroad is more 
sensible than fi xating on their return: if Israel can manage this despite 
its particular historical circumstances, then other states should be able 
to make a similar leap. This kind of modest diaspora policy is more 
likely to succeed than the alternative. Just as importantly, it is less likely 
to induce a backlash on the part of resident nationals disturbed by the 
showering of public monies, benefi ts and rights on individuals who 
have elected to live elsewhere.
What about host governments? It is hard to offer policy prescriptions 
given the diversity of national approaches that exist, but we can suggest 
that host countries will need to accept the reality that many of their 
people have plural national identities. That is not to say that immigrants 
are not emotionally attached to the country in which they live, but 
simply that many have a mix of affi liations, including a persistent 
affi liation with their homelands. It is often impossible, in other words, to 
reduce one’s identity to a single descriptor. Governments will always be 
preoccupied, of course, with the question of creating an integrated and 
cohesive national community. The answer is likely to lie along the lines 
proposed by Francis Fukuyama: promote an inclusive national identity 
and a common liberal culture; allow naturalisation and citizenship on 
a non-ethnic basis under conditions that are less (rather than more) 
onerous; deal with people as individuals not just as members of groups; 
and provide dignity to immigrants and other marginalised groups by 
ensuring they have jobs.439 Host governments should also be careful to 
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separate the broad issues of identity from the urgent but narrower issues 
of security. A real danger for states facing internal security threats is 
that they overreact, thereby alienating their constituent communities, 
doing violence to the values they seek to protect, and diminishing their 
appeal to the potential future immigrants whom they need to replenish 
their human capital.
There are implications in all this, too, for the international system 
as well as its component states. As DeParle observes: ‘The movement 
of people – the most intimate form of globalization – is the one with 
the fewest rules.’440 The triangular relationships between diasporas, 
homelands and host countries need to be managed adroitly, in 
order to maximise the possible benefi ts fl owing from diasporas and 
minimise the likely adverse consequences. The world would profi t 
from the development of rules (or at least understandings between 
states) on a number of the issues raised in this paper, including the 
cost of remittances, the permissibility of long-distance politicking 
and activism, and the allocation of responsibility for the protection 
of nationals.441
The world should remember, fi nally, the advantages as well as the 
disadvantages accruing from the rise of diasporas. There is a tendency 
for homelands to see migration as economically dangerous and for host 
countries to see it as socially threatening; but in fact there are usually 
benefi ts to be had for both sides. Furthermore, there is another, broader 
dimension to consider. As Amin Maalouf writes, diasporans ‘live in 
a sort of frontier zone criss-crossed by ethnic, religious or other fault 
lines. But by virtue of this situation… they have a special role to play 
in forging links, eliminating misunderstandings, making some parties 
more reasonable and others less belligerent, smoothing out diffi culties, 
seeking compromise. Their role is to act as bridges, go-betweens, 
mediators between the various communities and cultures.’442
Robin Cohen argues that in an age of globalisation, ‘the world is 
being organized vertically by nation-states and regions, but horizontally 
by an overlapping, permeable, multiple system of interactions.’443 
Diasporas represent one such system. Diasporas are world wide webs 
– encircling the globe heedless of national borders, connecting people 
with distant geographies and governments, binding countries together 
and pulling them into each other’s way, and complicating the processes 
of international relations.
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Appendix 1: Table of selected diasporas 
Diaspora Indicative size Primary locations
Examples of diaspora 
consciousness
Examples of 
homeland’s 
engagement with 
diaspora
Examples of 
diaspora’s infl uence 
on homeland
Australian 1 million
UK and Ireland, Western Europe, 
North Asia, North America, Southeast 
Asia
Strong expatriate 
organisations e.g. Advance, 
survey evidence of 
attachment to homeland
Change in government 
rhetoric, public opinion
Projection of contemporary 
image internationally
Chinese 33 million +
Southeast Asia, North America, 
Africa, the Pacifi c, Australia
Resumption of Chinese 
names, diaspora 
tourism, strong 
diaspora organisations, 
international protests in 
support of PRC positions, 
fei ch’ien payments transfer 
system
Sponsorship of diaspora 
visits, relationships with 
diaspora organisations, 
altered public discourse 
about emigrants, provision 
of consular protection
Remittances, trade and 
investment
Cuban 1.5 million US (especially Florida)
Strong cultural coherence, 
‘Little Havana’ in Miami
Minimal, although some 
change in rhetoric
Impact on US-Cuba 
relations
Filipino 8 million
North America, the Gulf, East Asia 
and Europe
Pakidala payments transfer 
system
Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration, cultural 
prominence of OFWs
Remittances, importance 
in Filipino politics
Indian 25 million +
The Gulf, North America, UK, South 
Africa, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, 
East Africa and Fiji
Strong cultural coherence,  
diaspora tourism, 
consumption of Bollywood 
fi lms and other Indian 
media
High Level Committee 
on the Indian Diaspora, 
Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs, Pravasi 
Bharatiya Divas, PIO cards
Remittances, investment, 
growing Indian-American 
lobby helped secure 
congressional approval for 
2006 US-India nuclear deal
Irish Up to 70 million
US, UK, Canada, Australia, South 
America
Cultural coherence (e.g. 
participation in St Patrick’s 
Day celebrations)
Ministerial attendance at 
international St Patrick’s 
Day celebrations, political 
rhetoric
Irish-Americans’ impact 
on Northern Ireland peace 
process
Israeli 500,000-750,000
North America, Europe, Australia and 
South Africa
Strong Israeli identity
Shift in political rhetoric 
and media coverage, 
incentives to return
Trade and investment
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Diaspora Indicative size Primary locations
Examples of diaspora 
consciousness
Examples of 
homeland’s 
engagement with 
diaspora
Examples of 
diaspora’s infl uence 
on homeland
Italian Up to 60 million
US, Western Europe, South America, 
Canada, Australia
Rising sense of Italianità 
(Italianness) since the 
1980s
Tremaglia law, generous 
citizenship rights, 
Directorate General for 
Italians Abroad and 
Migration Policies
Dissemination of Italian 
culture, recent infl uence 
of diaspora MPs on Italian 
politics
Jewish 8 million
US, Western Europe, Canada, Russia, 
South America, Australia
Strong Jewish identity, 
infl uential communal 
organisations, theological, 
cultural and political focus 
on Israel
Strong political engagement 
with diaspora, ‘Israel 
experience’ programs
International support for 
Israel, infl uence on Israeli 
politics
Mexican 30 million
US (especially California, Texas, 
Arizona, Colorado and Illinois)
Hometown associations, 
cultural, religious and 
linguistic coherence
Political rhetoric, external 
voting, matricula consular
Remittances, effect on US-
Mexico relations
Moroccan 2.5-3.5 million
Western Europe (especially France, 
Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and 
Germany), North America, Israel
International rallies 
against Polisario
Shift in policy and rhetoric 
towards courting the 
diaspora, e.g. Opération 
Transit
Remittances
New Zealand 500,000-1 million UK and Ireland, Australia, US           
Energetic diaspora 
organisations, e.g. KEA
Government’s ‘talent 
initiative’, political rhetoric
Projection of contemporary 
image internationally
Russian 25 million +
Countries on Russia’s periphery, US, 
UK and Western Europe, Israel
Signifi cant anti-Kremlin 
activism within the 
diaspora
Political rhetoric, 
incentives to return
Remittances
Turkish 5 million
Western Europe (especially Germany, 
France, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium 
and UK), US, Australia
Cultural coherence, 
popularity of Turkish 
language satellite 
TV, strong diaspora 
organisations, e.g. DİTİB, 
Milli Görüs
Diyanet’s provision of 
religious services to 
diaspora 
Remittances, effect 
on European views of 
Turkey, supply of political 
candidates
Sources: Various case studies and examples throughout this paper.
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Appendix 2: List of interviews
Name Position
Bekir Alboğa Dialogue Commissioner, Diyanet  
İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği,   
Cologne, 11 June 2007.
Sadi Arslan President, Diyanet İşleri Türk-  
İslam Birliği, Cologne, 11 June  
2007.
Professor Sencer Ayata Middle East Technical 
University, Ankara, 7 June 2007.
Professor Ali Bardakoğlu President, Diyanet İşleri   
Başkanlığı, Ankara, 7 June 2007.
Dr Sanjaya Baru Media Adviser to the Prime   
Minister, New Delhi, 
 3 November  2006.
Dr Simone Battiston and 
Dr Bruno Mascitelli Swinburne University of   
Technology, Sydney,
 20 September 2007.
Dr Tal Becker Policy Advisor to the Minister of  
Foreign Affairs,  Jerusalem,
 3 June 2007.
Vivek Bharati Advisor (National Policy,   
Programme & Projects),   
Federation of Indian Chambers
 of Commerce and Industry, New  
Delhi, 2 November 2006.
On. Gino Bucchino Member, Camera dei Deputati,  
Rome, 23 October 2006.
Anita Butler Department of Foreign Affairs  
and Trade, by telephone, 
 20 March 2006.
Cons. Amb. Antonella Cavallari Chief of Staff to Senator Franco 
Danieli, Italian Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Rome, 23 October 2006.
Marty Davis Head, Zionist Activities  
Department, World Zionist   
Organization, Jerusalem, 
 3 June 2007.
Associate Professor Hayriye Erbas Ankara University, Ankara,
 7 June 2007.
Eran Etzion Chief of Staff, Israel National  
Security Council, Jerusalem,
 4 June 2007.
On. Marco Fedi Member, Camera dei Deputati,  
Melbourne, 25 August 2006, and  
 Rome, 23 October 2006.
Haim Ghiuzeli Director, Databases, Beth   
Hatefutsoth, Tel Aviv, 4 June 2007.
Urmi A. Goswami Special Correspondent, The   
Economic Times, New Delhi,
 2 November 2006.
Maria Gratschew Programme Offi cer, International 
Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, Sydney, 17 
September 2007.
Gael Grunewald Head, Hagshama Department, 
World Zionist Organization, 
Jerusalem, 30 May 2007.
Colin Hill Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, by telephone, 16 
March 2007.
Professor Ahmet İçduygu Koç University, Istanbul, 8 June 
2007.
Dr S. Jaishankar Joint Secretary (Americas), 
Ministry of External Affairs, 
New Delhi, 3 November 2006.
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Professor David S. Katz Tel Aviv University, Istanbul, 
6 June 2007.
Professor Kemal Kirişci  Boğaziçi University, Sydney, 
11 October 2007.
David Kreizelman Foreign Policy Associate, 
American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee, Jerusalem, 
3 June 2007.
Marc Kurs Director, Visitors Center, Beth 
Hatefutsoth, Tel Aviv, 
4 June 2007.
Malay Mishra Joint Secretary (Diaspora 
Services), Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs, New Delhi, 
2 November 2006.
Professor C. Raja Mohan Strategic Affairs Editor, 
The Indian Express, New Delhi, 
3 November 2006.
On. Franco Narducci Member, Camera dei Deputati, 
Rome, 23 October 2006.
Professor Sari Nusseibeh Rector, Al-Quds University, 
Jerusalem, 31 May 2007.
Mark Regev Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Jerusalem, 30 May 2007.
Hon. Mitchell B. Reiss Former Special Envoy of the 
President and the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland, 
Department of State, by email, 
19 February 2007.
Rachael Risby-Raz Diaspora Affairs Adviser, Prime 
Minister’s Offi ce, Jerusalem, 
3 June 2007.
Beppe Severgnini Columnist, Corriere della Sera, by 
telephone, 22 September 2006. 
Shmuel Ben Shmuel Head of World Jewish and 
Inter-Religious Affairs Bureau, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Jerusalem, 30 May 2007.
Professor Stefano Silvestri President, Istituto Affari 
Internazionali, Rome, 25 October 
2006.
Mehmet Sertaç Sönmezay Deputy Director General for 
Expatriate Turks, Migration, 
Asylum and Property Issues, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Ankara, 7 June 2007.
Moshe Vigdor Director General, Jewish Agency 
for Israel, Jerusalem, 3 June 
2007.
Associate Professor Hakan Yilmaz Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 6 
June 2007.
A number of other interviews are not listed for reasons of 
confi dentiality.
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